

On Phrasal Pragmatics and What is Descriptively Referred to¹

ESTHER ROMERO and BELÉN SORIA
*Department of Philosophy,
University of Granada*

In this paper, we discuss contextualism, a philosophical position that some pragmatists have endorsed as a result of the philosophical reflection on pragmatics as a science. In particular, we challenge, from the results on phrasal pragmatics, the contextualist approach on incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymy according to which optional pragmatic processes of interpretation are required (an optional pragmatic process of recovering unarticulated constituents for incompleteness and an optional pragmatic process of transfer for metonymy). By contrast, we argue from the standpoint of phrasal pragmatics that what is descriptively referred to depends, in both cases, on truth-conditionally mandatory pragmatic processes of recovery of unarticulated constituents.

“It is by no means clear what features should incline us to bet that we have located the rough boundaries of a potential science.” (Slater 1997, 35)

A pragmatic theory is a theory about the role of context in human communication, particularly, in verbal communication. It is difficult, at the current state of pragmatic theories, to say if pragmatics is a science or not. Previous works in this field have raised an important debate on how to distinguish a pragmatic content from a semantic one but the debate has led us to no clear conclusion on the degree of context sensi-

¹ Financial support for this research, which has been carried out in the project “Phrasal Pragmatics” (HUM 2006–08418), has been provided by Spanish Ministry of Science and Education (DGICYT) and European Funds (FEDER). This paper has benefited from comments in the Dubrovnik Philosophy and Linguistics Conference (2008) and partially from comments on incomplete definite descriptions in the Barcelona SEFA Conference (2007) and on referential metonymy in the Lodz Perspectives on Metonymy Conference (2005). We are most grateful to Dunja Jutronic and Rosa Morillas for their useful comments and suggestions.

tivity and, thus, on the features of the boundaries of pragmatics as a science. Indeed, the role of context in meaning is far from settled.²

In this paper, we want to raise some questions in this respect in order to shed some new light on some of the criteria that theorists have used to argue for different degrees of context sensitivity. In particular, we will explore what the triggering conditions for different types of pragmatic processes are, which criteria apply for a pragmatic process to be considered as optional or as mandatory and, finally, what the possible linguistic inputs for pragmatic processes are. These aspects are essential to the domain of pragmatics and are often ill described in the current debate.

Before going on with the details of our proposal on one subfield of pragmatics, phrasal pragmatics, we find it necessary to explain why we think it is worth considering several subfields in pragmatics. Traditionally, the input for pragmatic processes has been the proposition (semantically expressed or said). More recently, however, there have been new studies arguing for sub-propositional pragmatic processes, that is, processes that take as their input a subpropositional unit. This has raised discussions about whether the result of these processes are part of what is said or what is implied. In any case, the possibility of pragmatic processes affecting subpropositional linguistic units could be supported by the recent breakthrough by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002, 1569) on the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language: recursion.

In recent works on the faculty of language, it is argued that humans, but no other animal, take the power of recursion to create an open-ended and limitless system of communication. Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) say that it seems relatively clear, after nearly a century of intensive research on animal communication, that “no species other than humans has a comparable capacity to recombine meaningful units into an unlimited variety of larger structures, each differing systematically in meaning.” (1576). And they go on to argue that:

Natural languages go beyond pure local structure by including a capacity for recursive embedding of phrases within phrases, which can lead to statistical regularities that are separated by an arbitrary number of words or phrases. (1577)

Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch ask why our system of recursion operates over a broader range of elements or input (e.g., numbers, words) than other animals.

² For example, literalism and contextualism are now opposing views on the role of context in yielding the propositional content expressed by an utterance. The difference between these two positions depends on whether extralinguistic context has a minimal effect on explicit content or not. Although it is just a matter of degree, these positions keep considering each other radically misleading. For an attack to literalism see, for example, Recanati (2004) and for a radical rejection of contextualism, see Cappelen and Lepore (2005).

One possibility, consistent with current thinking in the cognitive sciences, is that recursion in animals represent a modular system designed for a particular function (e.g., navigation) and impenetrable with respect to other systems. During evolution, the modular and highly domain-specific system of recursion may have become penetrable and domain general. This opened the way for humans, perhaps uniquely, to apply the power of recursion to other problems. (1578)

This tentative answer to the question seems to us rather interesting and with important consequences to the theory of pragmatics. If the human system of recursion becomes penetrable and domain general, it seems rather reasonable to think that the power of recursion can also be applied to pragmatic resolution. Thus the input of pragmatic processes can also be phrases. This would lead to a study of the pragmatic processes that operate at phrasal level, to a study of phrasal pragmatics.

If pragmatic resolution can affect any unit of meaning including subpropositional units such as words and phrases, and the result of this subpropositional pragmatic adjustment can undergo pragmatic adjustment again, it is easier to explain the open-ended and limitless capacity of the human communication system. Even actual defendants of the semantic proposition as the input of pragmatic processes such as Borg now admit that the language faculty is not totally impenetrable:

To put things crudely, it can't be the case that the language faculty remains entirely encapsulated until the point of outputting a sentence-level content. Rather the picture is one where the outputs of the language faculty are available at incremental levels, so that, as it were, other modules or central-processing systems can 'see' the construction of sentence-level meaning stage by stage and can utilise the sub-sentential fragments of meaning which are going into the construction of sentence-meaning. (Borg forthcoming, n.15)³

Bearing in mind that the outputs of the language faculty are available at incremental levels, in section 1, we introduce a brief approximation to the scope of pragmatics and to several of its new subfields: lexical pragmatics and phrasal pragmatics. These subfields presuppose the linguistic underdetermination of what is said, and they have as their object of study the pragmatic processes of interpretation that take as input words or phrases respectively and result in subpropositional contents involved in what is said. We expound, in addition, the philosophical position known as contextualism. Contextualism is essentially opposed to literalism in its consideration that optional pragmatics processes are involved in what is said. In section 2, we concentrate on phrasal pragmatics, the area of pragmatics needed to explain the pragmatic enrichment of concepts expressed by phrases or phrase fragments. We

³ Nevertheless, Borg (forthcoming) argues that semantic content is delivered by a modular language faculty which entails that there can be no appeal to the intentional states of speakers at the semantic level. For her, no pragmatically enhanced reading is permitted to feed back into the semantics module to effect the semantic analysis of the sentence.

illustrate the basic data that a theory of phrasal pragmatics should explain and we also introduce the mandatory/optional distinction as one that affects the demand of contextual information. This leads us to raise the question of whether our explanation of the incompleteness of definite descriptions from phrasal pragmatics challenges the contextualist approach. In section 3, we deal with definite descriptions in a new Fregean vein, in particular, we account for the identification and interpretation criteria of definite descriptions. Both the identification and interpretation criteria of definite descriptions are subpropositional in the sense that they do not require the retrieval of a proposition for their occurrence. From this position, we deal with incompleteness of both incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymies. We show from phrasal pragmatics that the results of interpreting incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymies are structurally more complex concepts that intervene in what is said and that what is referred to by them is achieved by applying a subpropositional pragmatic process of adding conceptual material to the concepts encoded by noun phrases, a process which, in spite of not being always linguistically mandated, is never optional. Its mandatory character is due to the fact that most of the sentences that include incomplete noun phrases cannot fix literal truth-conditions that can be evaluated in the context of its utterance. Finally, in section 4, we conclude that the explanation of incompleteness of definite descriptions, either incomplete definite descriptions or referential metonymies, proves the contextualist approach unsuitable for this issue.

1. *Pragmatics and its subfields*

A pragmatic theory is a theory of interpretation.⁴ It explains how interpreters, given what a semantic theory has to say about an expression, identify what a speaker means by uttering this expression on a given occasion. Our knowledge of both language and the context permits us to understand speaker's meaning, the object of study of pragmatics.

Pragmatics, understood as the study of the influence of contextual information on meaning, may be considered as an empirical science.⁵ It has been developed by philosophers of language and linguists in the past fifty years. The sources of evidence most theorists have used for pragmatics in its origin come from theorists' intuitions about interpretation, about how an imagined utterance would be interpreted in a hypothetical situation, and from observations of linguistic behaviour about how a genuine utterance, in a verbal exchange, together with data about the speakers and the situation is interpreted. The preference for a particular pragmatic proposal is justified on grounds of consistency, simplicity, explicitness, comprehensiveness, explanatory

⁴ Producing an overarching theory of interpretation will require, as Neale (2005, 166) recognizes, nothing short of a complete theory of mind.

⁵ See, for instance, Noveck and Sperber (2004), Sperber and Wilson (2005).

force, and integration with other proposals. Nowadays, evidence for pragmatics includes not only the theorist's intuitions mentioned but also experimental methods to test, evaluate and compare systematic pragmatic claims.⁶ Although it is hard to find in pragmatics crucial evidence (experimental or not) that would clearly confirm one claim and disconfirm another, experimental tests should be used, together with intuition and observation, to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses about utterance interpretation.

The interpretation of an utterance, the subject matter of pragmatics, involves identifying and interpreting the individual words uttered, grasping their syntactic arrangement, and contextual information (on situation, speakers/hearers, etc.) to obtain the speaker's meaning. As the speaker's meaning can be compounded by what the speaker said and what the speaker implied by uttering an expression, a pragmatic theory may have two roles in a theory of interpretation. One is to explain how hearers manage to identify what the speakers imply and the other is, under the assumption of linguistic underdetermination of what is said, to explain how hearers manage to identify what speakers say.

The linguistic underdetermination thesis recognizes that syntax and word meaning together underdetermine what is said (Carston 2002, 19). A semantic theory cannot explain how interpreters identify what the speaker said. For example, what the speaker said by uttering an expression on a given occasion depends, among other things, on identifying speaker's reference by referential expressions in the former and identifying what the speaker refers to by means of a referential device usually involves not only consulting the semantic information carried by the expression uttered but also the exercise of cognitive capacities that integrate this semantic information with all sorts of contextual information. Identifying what the speaker refers to is something that must be explained, as the identification of other ingredients of what is said, by a pragmatic theory.

The philosophical reflection on pragmatics has led some authors to a contextualist position of what is said. Contextualism is opposed to literalism. Literalists argue for the most traditional and literal notion of *what is said* in which the contextual information is demanded linguistically to avoid referential underdetermination and ambiguity. For a contextualist such as Recanati, what is said by the speaker is not always literally said, what is said (the truth-conditional content of the utterance) is an aspect of speaker's meaning (2004, 4), and what is said by an utterance should be explained considering (in addition to saturation and disambiguation) optional pragmatic processes (2004, 86), processes that are triggered independently of the syntactic and semantic features of the sentence uttered. "Optional" is opposed to

⁶ For an example of evidence from empirical tests, see the case of bridging inferences in Matsui (2000).

“obligatory” or “mandatory” when applied to pragmatic contributions to what is said. The contextualist distinguishes between two kinds of “optional” processes: those that effect modulations or adjustments of linguistically encoded meanings, atomic concepts, such as loosening, and those that recover components of content which are not linguistically indicated in any way.

Lexical pragmatics studies the lexical adjustment process that effects modulations of atomic concepts expressed by words. These modulations are, at least in the framework of relevance theory, derived *ad hoc* atomic concepts that intervene in the explicitly communicated content of an utterance (Carston 2005-unpublished).⁷ They are the outcome of a single interpretative process based on the interaction among encoded concepts, contextual information and the Principle of Relevance.

This subfield of pragmatics, in our opinion, cannot fully explain the influence that contextual information exerts at a sub-propositional level (Romero and Soria forthcoming). And this is so because sometimes the input of a pragmatic process is not an atomic concept or the result of applying it is not a derived atomic concept. We called “phrasal pragmatics” the subfield that studies the processes that result in complex concepts. One of its interests is the study of acts of reference such as those produced by the use singular and definite noun phrases. But before considering this, let’s go through some relevant concepts in phrasal pragmatics.

2. *Phrasal Pragmatics*

In general, phrasal pragmatics has as its subject matter the pragmatic tasks required to get communicated complex concepts. The pragmatic tasks needed in phrasal pragmatics to get communicated complex concepts are: (i) *ad hoc* concepts construction for complex concepts, and (ii) adding of missing (or unarticulated) constituents of concepts. The concepts obtained by these tasks are the constituents of the thoughts expressed by the utterances in which the phrases⁸ appear.

Phrasal pragmatics contrasts with lexical pragmatics. In a primary approximation of the latter, only the pragmatics of atomic concepts is taken into account. Its aim is to account for *ad hoc* concept construction, to account for how atomic concepts lexicalized by morphophonemic words can, through pragmatic derivation, yield *ad hoc* atomic concepts. More recently, Wilson and Carston (2007, 285) consider phrases as input of pragmatic adjustment. In that sense, lexical pragmatics also accounts for *ad hoc* concept construction for complex concepts, the first task we mentioned for phrasal pragmatics.

Lexical pragmatics is concerned with narrowing, broadening and a

⁷ Nevertheless, in the original proposal of lexical pragmatics by Blutner (1998), the conceptual adjustments contribute to conversational implicature, and they are explained with a straightforward formulation of conversational implicature.

⁸ “Maximal projections” in Chomskian terms.

combination of the two, the pragmatic results involved in constructing derived *ad hoc* concepts,

(...) to give a unitary account of how word meanings are adjusted in context, such that the outcome of that adjustment process may be a narrowing, a broadening, or a combination of the two. (Carston 2005-unpublished)

concepts whose denotation become a subset of the encoded concept (narrowing), 'bachelor' used to mean ELEGIBLE BACHELOR, or become wider (broadening), 'sick' used to mean ALMOST SICK, or even can suffer a complete change as in metaphorical extension (combination of broadening and narrowing), 'dragon' used to mean INTIMIDATING PERSON.

The possibility of a complete change in the denotation of a lexicalized concept, Recanatì argues, leads to include transfer in lexical pragmatics, as a result of an adjustment process of a word, for example, used metonymically. Although for us metonymy is not a case of transfer, we do consider transfer to explain the adjustment required in a word used metaphorically and not merely broadening or a combination of broadening and narrowing (Romero and Soria 2007). Example (1) serves to show this task. In (1),

- (1) [Two members of a university department, Mary and Robert, have very different views on how to cope with the recent announcement that their department's funding is to be severely cut. Mary is reluctant to discuss her ideas with Robert, commenting:] Robert is a *bulldozer*.

the denotation of the communicated concept, BULLDOZER*, is not the result of broadening BULLDOZER to denote both Mary and bulldozers, as relevance theorists would say, rather it is the result of transfer (Romero and Soria 2005a, 2007). BULLDOZER* does not include any bulldozer in its denotation. The transfer of meaning involved in metaphor is a process by means of which the metaphorical concept acquires some new properties: those properties of bulldozers that can change in such a way that can be applied to the objects we are talking about. The new properties are so different that the denotation of the concept changes completely.

Narrowing, broadening and transfer are pragmatic tasks that are also considered by phrasal pragmatics. This is so when we do not need to consider isolated word meanings as inputs of the conceptual processes of adjustment. The inputs for those tasks are concepts in general and not just atomic concepts. Now, lexical pragmatics, as we have just said, considers phrases as input of modulation, although it does not consider transfer of meaning as a result of pragmatic adjustment. An example of transfer applied to a complex concept appears in the interpretation of (2). The metaphorical interpretation of (2)

- (2) [An American academic, Morris, goes to a British institution as a visiting professor and A says about him]: In all modesty Morris imagined he must be the *biggest fish in this backwater*.

has a complex concept as input, the *ad hoc* concept BIGGEST FISH IN THIS BACKWATER, that must be metaphorically adjusted as a whole to form the propositions expressed by the utterance (2). Its metaphorical adjustment results in [BIGGEST FISH IN THIS BACKWATER]*. This is very different from considering FISH as an independent input of this pragmatic process. It is different in the sense that the result of this interpretation is the *ad hoc* atomic concept FISH*. FISH* would have some properties that can be applied to academics but these properties are irrelevant to understand (2). Interlocutors are not interested in the properties of FISH, but in the properties of the concept BIGGEST FISH IN THIS BACKWATER. The particular properties of BIGGEST FISH IN THIS BACKWATER such as ‘being able to eat the other fishes in the backwater’ when applied metaphorically to Morris permit us to know how he is feeling. Only [BIGGEST FISH IN THIS BACKWATER]* allows understanding how Morris is, to wit, the person who conceives himself as the most powerful academic in this British insignificant institution, while BIGGEST [FISH]* IN THIS BACKWATER doesn’t. To interpret (2), the relevant *ad hoc* metaphorical concept is [BIGGEST FISH IN THIS BACKWATER]* and not BIGGEST [FISH]* IN THIS BACKWATER.

There is another aspect of the truth-conditions of some utterances that phrasal pragmatics can specify: the missing constituents at the level of phrase. Just by the fact that complex concepts are complex and thus, at least in part, compositionally determined, we have the possibility of conveying them without articulating part of them phonetically. With respect to missing constituents, we can distinguish in general between the cases in which the missing constituent (marked in the example in small capitals) is a constituent of a thought as in (3) and those in which the missing constituent is a constituent of a concept as in (4)

- (3) [A realizes that B, when making his breakfast, is looking for the marmalade and A says:] [THE MARMALADE IS] On the top shelf.
 (4) [In a hairdresser’s, a hairdresser tells another:] The fair-haired [CUSTOMER] is waiting for her check.

While the adding of missing constituents takes place at the level of phrase in utterance (4), the adding of missing constituents takes place at the level of sentence in (3). The expression included in (3) is directly incomplete. The sentential expression included in (4) is incomplete in an indirect way as it includes an incomplete phrase. The sentence is incomplete only because one of its constituents is.

At phrasal level we can distinguish between fragments of complex concepts represented by an incomplete structure (that cannot codify a complete concept) such as the incomplete structure, ‘the fair-haired’, that appears in (4), and fragments of complex concepts represented by a complete structure such as those that appear in (5) and (6)

- (5) [Peter has cleaned Mary’s room and, when she is looking for her handout, she asks him where it is and he says:] When I cleaned your room, I did not touch the table [IN MARY’S ROOM].

- (6) [Looking at the ham sandwich customer, a waitress tells another:]
The ham sandwich [CUSTOMER] is waiting for his check.

in which the incomplete concepts are represented by a complete structure, 'the table' and 'the ham sandwich' respectively, that codifies a concept not intended by the speaker but included in some sense in the intended concept.

In (4), at least the head, the obligatory element, of the noun phrase (NP) is missing. In order to interpret (4), we will have to add conceptual material, a specific element that can be easily understood by the interlocutor in that (linguistic and extralinguistic) context, to wit, CUSTOMER, in order to reach a complete concept.

In (5), an example that includes an incomplete definite description, a pragmatic task is needed to add some conceptual constituents of a complex concept which is in its turn a constituent of what is said. The same may be said about (6), an example that includes an NP used metonymically.

To interpret (5) and (6), we have to decode the concepts linguistically-specified by the phrase fragments and relate these concepts to those unarticulated concepts that enrich the sub-propositional structure; concepts that, if linguistically-expressed by words, would be part of the phrase as a modifier for (5) and as the notional head of the intended concept for (6). The pragmatic enrichment of the concept expressed by a phrase fragment allows the recovery of these unarticulated constituents so that we get the complex concepts: TABLE IN MARY'S ROOM and HAM SANDWICH CUSTOMER for (5) and (6) respectively.

To communicate complex concepts without articulating part of them phonetically is something that characteristically happens in cases of given information required in acts of reference by means of singular definite noun phrases. In incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymies, complex concepts arise out of the pragmatic process of addition of conceptual material to linguistically encoded (or even pragmatically derived) material;⁹ the addition takes place at the level of concepts (phrase) and not directly at the level of proposition (sentence).

We can distinguish several mechanisms that are studied in phrasal pragmatics, in particular those that intervene in the interpretation of incomplete definite descriptions and metonymical phrases, but, as we have just said, what is important for the aim of this article is to know the way in which the interpretation process is triggered: either as something indispensable for a propositional content to arise or as something

⁹ The pragmatic process of adding conceptual material to pragmatically derived material is involved, for example, in cases of incomplete metaphorical definite descriptions, in which we need to obtain a derived metaphorical concept previous to the application of the pragmatic process of addition. In A's utterance of 'The cat is on the mat' as an answer to B's question about the location of A's only daughter, who is two years old, there is an incomplete metaphorical definite description, considering this use of 'The cat'.

dispensable. In this sense, we will attend to the identification criteria included in the proposals on definite descriptions and metonymy. But before doing so, let's add some information on the mandatory/optional distinction.

The distinction between mandatory and optional demand of contextual information is not easy. We said that a first approximation to this distinction depends on considering that a pragmatic process is optional if no element of the linguistic expression used requires the pragmatic process of interpretation. This criterion is often characterized by saying that the process is not demanded truth-conditionally. Nevertheless, these two characterizations of optionality are not, in our opinion, equivalent. In this sense, as we will see now, a more complex distinction between mandatory and optional is possible if we specify that optional processes of interpretation are triggered neither linguistically nor truth-conditionally.

We find, as we can see in Figure 1,

Figure 1. *Two senses of mandatory*

Mandatory _L	Mandatory _T	Examples
+	+	<i>He is asleep</i>
+	–	She is poor <i>but</i> honest
–	+	The table is covered with books
–	–	It is raining

two senses of “mandatory”. From a linguistic point of view, a process or its result is mandatory (mandatory_L from now on) when it is, as Recanati (2004, 98) said, “required in virtue of a linguistic convention governing the use of a particular construction (or class of constructions).” From a truth-conditional point of view, an interpretation process or its result is mandatory (mandatory_T from now on) when it is necessary for a propositional content to be present in the interpretation of an utterance (2004, 62).¹⁰ These two senses of “mandatory” do not have the same denotation for us.¹¹

¹⁰ Many authors such as Carston (2002), Neale (2007), Sperber and Wilson (1986/95), to mention only some, argue that sentences encode partial or incomplete propositions. Neale (2007, 79) says: “I prefer to talk of sentences encoding *blueprints*.” and adds: “No proposition blueprint is itself a proposition”. Neale’s *blueprints* are called “template” by Carston; “propositional radical” by Bach (2005), etc. For a blueprint to become a proposition, some pragmatic processes are needed, they are truth-conditionally mandatory.

¹¹ Although Recanati offers these two characterizations of “mandatory”, he believes that both determine the same kind of phenomena. Furthermore, he maintains that a process is obligatory or optional in an exclusive way. Thus, for example, saturation is always obligatory and enrichment is always optional.

Sometimes, a process is mandatory in the two senses, as when pronouns are involved. The meaning of 'he' sets up a variable to be contextually filled. The saturation process is linguistically demanded. In addition, the saturation process is also truth-conditionally demanded: without it we do not have the semantic value that intervenes in the propositional content expressed by the utterance of the sentence that includes it and that determines the truth-conditions that permit to evaluate the utterance.

Sometimes, the interpretation process is mandatory_L but not mandatory_T, as the process required for recovering the conventional implicature of 'but'. The meaning of 'but' linguistically demands a saturation process but it is not truth-conditionally demanded. When the mandatory_L process of saturation is applied, it determines non-truth-conditional aspects of the utterance meaning called "conventional implicature".

In other occasions, the process is mandatory_T but not mandatory_L. The well-formed sentence, 'The table is covered with books' does not have a slot, but if the presupposition failure associated with 'the table' were not contextually solved, there would be an expression failure in its utterance (Glanzberg 2005). Then, to avoid an expression failure (a failure to express a proposition), a mandatory_T pragmatic process is triggered.

Finally, there are processes that are not mandatory in any of these senses. An utterance of the well-formed sentence, 'It is raining', expresses a propositional content without including the circumstances of evaluation. If the speaker intends to communicate some particular circumstances of evaluation, they are recovered by free enrichment (Recanati 2004, 115–30).

The contextualist approach on incomplete definite descriptions and metonymies considers that they require optional pragmatic processes that are not triggered linguistically or truth conditionally. What is referred to by an incomplete definite description should be explained considering an optional pragmatic process of enrichment of unarticulated elements and what is referred to by a referential metonymy should be explained considering an optional pragmatic process of transfer of meaning.

Obviously, the process to interpret incomplete definite descriptions would not be mandatory_L since there is no need to consider the non-generic singular definite noun phrases as requiring a process of recovering unarticulated constituents. But, if this process is indispensable to obtain a propositional content, the process would be mandatory_T. We argue for a mandatory_T process to interpret incomplete definite descriptions.

In cases of metonymical utterances, it is not so obvious that the required metonymical process to interpret them would not be mandatory_L. It is true that, if we only take into account the metonymically used NP, there is no need to consider it as linguistically requiring a

metonymical interpretation. But, if we consider the well-formedness condition on argument chain in Theta Theory,¹² most of the sentences used metonymically would be considered ill-formed sentences if an aphonic element were not recognized. The pragmatic process is demanded linguistically as Theta Theory is part of syntax and this theory often suggests a linguistic infelicity¹³ in cases of metonymy. When the sentence is well-formed, the required process to interpret the referential metonymy would be mandatory_T. Nevertheless, in both cases, the metonymical interpretation process is indispensable to obtain a propositional content, the metonymical process is mandatory_T.

3. Definite Descriptions and What the Speaker Descriptively Refers to

A pragmatic process is mandatory for the interpretation of an utterance if without its application it is not possible to pair a sentence with a propositional content. As a consequence, the identification criteria for the mandatory application of a pragmatic process must be subpropositional. If, as we have just said, incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymies require mandatory processes of interpretation,

¹² The Theta Criterion is a syntactic condition that establishes a one-to-one correspondence relation between thematic roles and arguments, such that every argument is assigned a single thematic role and every thematic role is assigned to a single argument. Essentially, the Theta Criterion is a well-formedness condition on argument chains, where the notion “chain” may include a move argument and its trace, or a non-moved argument alone. The Theta Criterion essentially holds at LF, where thematic relations are determined, but by virtue of PP it is expected to hold also at the levels of S-structure and D-structure.

¹³ The linguistic infelicity we are thinking of here is similar to the one that appears in sub-sentential speech and in both cases this infelicity triggers a pragmatic process of recovery of unvoiced material. Following Ludlow (2005, 105) we can consider that, as linguistic theory is currently constructed, “the derivation of LF crashes if it does not at a minimum yield something that is sentential in structure; if that constraint is yanked out of the theory then the theory collapses like a house of cards. Crucially, the theory requires that grammatical elements must be combined and moved (under economy constraints) until a successful derivation is computed. If success could be won for any arbitrary subsentential element, then the theory would be incapable of blocking anything.” This idea can also be applied to phrases (maximal projections), that is, so as the sub-clausal fragment that is actually pronounced is often not generated unless it is the product of clause level operations, there are sub-phrasal fragments that are generated as the product of phrase level operations. These operations must, of course, be compatible with clausal felicity conditions which include satisfaction of the Theta Criterion. The triggering conditions for the recovery or movement of elements in these cases of incomplete (sub-sentential or sub-phrasal and thus also sub-sentential) linguistic material is syntactic, however, the notional material is retrieved from the context and is hence pragmatic. For example, to go from the sub-clausal fragment that is actually pronounced “all in the garden” to a fully clausal form, we need context, that is, we need to consider a case where we are at a family reunion and a niece asks where the other children are so that we can get the complete structure: [The children are] all in the garden (Ludlow 2005, 99). The trigger is syntactic but the recovery of the relevant information is pragmatic.

they must be identified before elaborating a full propositional content. This is precisely what is defended in the explanation given for these two phenomena from phrasal pragmatics. But to understand this explanation, we have to expound first our proposal on definite descriptions.

3.1 *Explanation of Definite Descriptions in Phrasal Pragmatics*

The identification of a definite description is produced when there is a non-generic use of a singular and definite NP with a determiner. From a syntactic point of view, a definite description is a singular and definite NP with a definite determiner (the definite article ‘the’, ‘my’, and so on). However, this syntactic characterization is not enough. In order to have a definite description, we need a non-generic use of this type of NP. In (7),

(7) [A and B are talking about the succession to the throne in several countries and A utters:] The actual King of Spain has one son.

there is a singular definite NP with the determiner ‘the’, ‘the actual king of Spain’, this NP is used in a non-generic way, given the VP ‘has one son’. Thus in (7) the speaker uses the singular definite noun phrase, ‘the actual king of Spain’, as a definite description, this NP is identified as a definite description. The identification criteria are subpropositional in the sense that no retrieval of a proposition is required.

Once the definite and singular noun phrase is identified as a definite description, we argue that the interpretation of the determiner ‘the’, a quantifier, together with the rest of the noun phrase (‘the matrix’ from now on) is intended to provide the satisfaction conditions of an object which is, thus, descriptively characterized as an ingredient of the proposition expressed, object that falls under the concept that the matrix puts across. This is so, if the matrix puts across an individual concept, which is the type of argument suitable for the function that characterizes the quantifier ‘the’ in its non-generic use. The interpretation of a definite description depends on the composition of the meaning of ‘the’, a second-order concept, and the meaning of the matrix, a first-order concept. This composition provides an object descriptively characterized as an ingredient of the proposition expressed, formally represented for the definite description that appears in (7) as [The x : x is actual king of Spain].¹⁴ The logical form of (7), a representation that expresses at least all the syntactic properties relevant to the interpretation of (7), would be (7')

(7') [The x : x is an actual king of Spain] has one son.

The quantifier ‘the’, in its definite use, presupposes as argument a first-order concept (expressed by the matrix) that denotes a unique object, which will be the value of the quantifier ‘the’. ‘The’ presupposes that an

¹⁴ The second order concept, a quantifier, involved in a definite description is not equivalent to an existential and universal, as Russell said. There is just a quantifier and if contextual sensibility is admitted in order to explain incompleteness (Stanley and Williamson 1995), the logical problems of the Russellian definition dissolve (Romero and Soria 2008).

individual concept is expressed by the matrix and ‘actual king of Spain’ is presented as a description which suffices to define the referent, to distinguish it from everything else.¹⁵ In this case, the description defines by virtue of there being a unique object satisfying it. When using ‘the actual king of Spain’, the speaker refers to the object descriptively characterized by ‘actual king of Spain’ that expresses an individual concept. The denotation of the concept encoded by the matrix that follows the definite article must be a unique object, but this is not predicated of this concept.

The interpretation of the definite descriptions is, as the identification criteria, subpropositional. Interpretation is subpropositional in the sense that we interpret a definite description elaborating a complex concept that refers descriptively and that is an ingredient of the communicated proposition but no retrieval of a proposition is required for its elaboration.

3.2 *Incompleteness of Definite Descriptions in Phrasal Pragmatics*

Definite descriptions are, as we have just seen, natural language expressions which are used to refer and have utility because they encode satisfaction conditions on objects. If these conditions are not specific enough to be satisfied by just one object in the non-generic use of a singular and definite NP, we identify an incomplete definite description and we must resort to a pragmatic process to complete the specifications of the encoded satisfaction conditions until an individual concept is isolated so that the act of reference can be successful.

When “incompleteness” is used in relation to definite descriptions, it is usual to think about a singular and definite NP with a determiner whose matrix denotes more than one object, as in the non-generic use of ‘the table’ in examples such as (5). Cases like this are typically called ‘incomplete definite descriptions’ and their incompleteness has traditionally been attributed to the fact that the conditions imposed by the concept encoded in the matrix are not specific enough to put across an individual concept by means of which we can isolate an object. As the world is table abundant, in the non-generic use of ‘the table’, the matrix ‘table’ does not impose enough constraints to isolate a unique object by means of the meaning encoded in this lexical item. A pragmatic process is then called for in order to derive the information needed to complete the satisfaction conditions which allow the isolation of the object.

¹⁵ This does not mean that the speaker may identify what object is involved. This is not a claim to argue that definite descriptions only have a referential use as opposed to an attributive use. The distinction between definite descriptions used referentially or attributively is something different (Donnellan 1966). Indeed, the form and meaning of the ingredients of the sentence and the context do not permit us to distinguish between these two uses. They do not depend on semantics or pragmatics but on epistemology. In the referential use, there must be some specific object with which the speaker is acquainted, while in the attributive use there must be some specific object with which the speaker is not.

Nevertheless, this kind of incompleteness is not the only one that we can encounter in examples of incomplete definite descriptions. It is also possible to find cases where the linguistic expression provides us with part of the satisfaction conditions that isolate the object and there is no explicit expression encoding the information that is typically given in the matrix. The pragmatic derivation here entails retrieving the type of object and the linguistic material provides only the rest of the satisfaction conditions to isolate the particular object. Cases of this kind are called “referential metonymies” and a typical example is the one included in (6).¹⁶

Thus, we can distinguish two cases of incompleteness of definite descriptions: incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymies.

3.2.1 *Explanation of Incomplete Definite Descriptions in Phrasal Pragmatics*

The requirement that definite descriptions put across an individual concept as argument for the quantifier ‘the’ is often not fulfilled because there is more than one object that falls under the concept expressed by the matrix. ‘The table’, ‘the murderer’ are typical examples of singular definite noun phrases that when used in non-generic ways constitute incomplete definite descriptions, that is, they are noun phrases in which their matrixes, ‘table’ and ‘murderer’ are satisfied by more than one object. If there is more than one object denoted by the concept expressed by the matrix, the singular and definite NP used as a definite description cannot refer to an object and so it cannot work as a term. There is what is called by Glanzberg (2005) an “expression failure”, a failure reflected in a presupposition failure of the following kind: there is not a unique object denoted by the matrix but more than one. In these cases, the interpretation of the definite description is blocked and the definite description is identified as incomplete. The incomplete definite description, although it is a complete syntactically well-formed noun phrase, presents an expression failure and thus no proposition can be conveyed by the use of the sentence that includes it. If there is not an expressed proposition, there are no truth-conditions associated with the utterance that permits to evaluate it as true or false.

The identification of an incomplete definite description is reached when the hearer detects both a non-generic use of a singular and definite NP with a determiner and a non-empty and non-individual first-order concept expressed by the matrix of the NP. In the previous example (5),

¹⁶ Not all cases of referential metonymies, however, need to be expressed by means of a singular and definite NP with a determiner; they can also be expressed by definite NPs containing only a pronoun as in the metonymic use of ‘I’ in ‘I am parked out back’ where there is a reduction from ‘the car I drive’ into ‘I’.

- (5) [Peter has cleaned Mary's room and, when she is looking for her handout, she asks him where it is and he says:] When I cleaned your room, I did not touch the table [IN MARY'S ROOM].

if we consider the decoded predicate concept TOUCH, we know that the singular and definite NP with the determiner 'the', 'the table', is used in a non-generic way. In the non-generic use, the NP is used by the speaker to refer, to pick out some object or whatever the speaker wishes to say something about. The non-generic use of 'the table' in (5) shows that this NP is a definite description. As the first-order concept expressed by the matrix, 'table', denotes more than one object, the presupposition fails in the context. Thus, the interpretation of the definite description is blocked and the definite description is identified as incomplete. The speaker of (5) cannot refer to an object by resorting only to the satisfaction conditions encoded by 'table', he cannot descriptively refer to the intended object merely with the use of 'the table'. The sentence of (5) cannot express a proposition.

If the presupposition failure associated with 'the table' were not contextually solved, there would be a failure to express a proposition. The sentence logical form does not encode all properties relevant to interpretation. To avoid the incompleteness of the NP and thus an expression failure, a mandatory_T pragmatic process of enrichment to get an individual concept is triggered. Consequently, the quantifier noun phrase used as a definite description, [The x: x is a table], is sensible to the context before we interpret the sentence and something unarticulated arises in the NP.

In the interpretation of the incomplete definite description, we have to add the unarticulated conceptual material which isolates the unique entity intended by the speaker and which usually contains some referential component sensitive to the context (Neale 1990, 93–102). There is an enrichment of the encoded concept, TABLE. The unarticulated conceptual constituents are recoverable from the accessibility of information. Given the context of (5), we have to add IN MARY'S ROOM. The salient descriptive material retrieved from the context is added to the matrix so that there is some individual concept to satisfy the presupposition. When we recover the unarticulated constituents, we reconstruct the complex intended concept, TABLE IN MARY'S ROOM,¹⁷ an individual complex concept. Once the individual concept that functions as argument of the quantifier is obtained, the definite description refers to the value of the quantifier 'the', to the object that falls under the individual concept

¹⁷ The denotation of the concept TABLE IN MARY'S ROOM is a subset of the set of tables. Nevertheless, the conceptual restriction of decoded concepts by incomplete definite descriptions cannot be understood as a case of narrowing of lexical items because the structure of the concepts changes. Rather than having a conceptual change by means of additional descriptive material in an atomic concept, we have an extension of the conceptual structure by relating the decoded concept (atomic or not) with other concepts which typically are or contain some referential components sensitive to the context. We narrow the denotation of the concept TABLE but not with TABLE*.

that characterizes them descriptively. The sentence used that includes it allows saying something about that object, a propositional content, which can be true (or even false). The sentence logical form of (5) does not express all properties relevant to interpretation. In the interpretation, properties that have no counterparts in the logical form appear, but they are truth-conditionally demanded (mandatory_T).

To interpret (5), not only we construct an individual complex concept that together with the definite article refers to an object, the object denoted by the individual concept, we also determine what is said with the utterance (5): WHEN PETER CLEANED MARY'S ROOM, PETER DID NOT TOUCH THE TABLE IN MARY'S ROOM. From the interpretation of (5), the hearer knows that Peter did not touch the table in Mary's room, a quasi-singular proposition (Schiffer 1987, 182)¹⁸ that may be true or false.

Both the identification and interpretation criteria of the incomplete definite descriptions are subpropositional in the sense that they do not require the retrieval of a proposition for its application. They are the objects of study in phrasal pragmatics.

3.2.2 *Explanation of Referential Metonymy in Phrasal Pragmatics*

From the standpoint of phrasal pragmatics, referential metonymy is explained as a syntactic strategy in assigning informational prominence in singular and definite NPs marked by omission and supplantation of the lexical head in NP. Metonymy is similar to cases of focus constructions such as topicalization, cleft, tough movement, and so on in that they are marked syntactic structures to assign informational prominence.¹⁹

Focus constructions (Hofweber 2005) are ways to present information syntactically that are directly related to the focus that will result, but have no other effect on truth conditions. The peculiarity of these constructions is that a focus effect is achieved without special intonation, it is achieved using a special syntactic structure which is normally the result of extraction and movement. In these cases, particular parts of the syntactic material of the sentence are placed in special positions. Sentences (b) and (c) in (8) to (10) are typical examples of focus constructions:

- | | | |
|-----|--|-----------------------|
| (8) | (a) I can solve this problem. | |
| | (b) This problem, I can solve. | <i>topicalization</i> |
| (9) | (a) John solved the problem. | |
| | (b) It was John that solved the problem. | <i>cleft</i> |
| | (c) It was the problem that John solved. | <i>cleft</i> |

¹⁸ A quasi-singular proposition is that in which both the reference of a term and its linguistic mode of presentation are involved. They jointly constitute the semantic value of the term.

¹⁹ Although many sentences that involve referential metonymies are considered simply as ill-formed sentences by TG grammarians, we think that if the empirical evidence tells us that they are considered acceptable by a competent speaker, any syntactic theory should account for them.

- (10) (a) To teach John is easy.
 (b) It is easy to teach John. *extraposition*
 (c) John is easy to teach. *tough movement*

In (8a), there is an unmarked syntactic structure in which there is no specific focus. Conversely, (8b) is a case of topicalization, it involves a relocation of the syntactic material, in particular, the complement in the IP (inflection phrase) is moved to the IP-spec position, that is, the direct object is extracted from its normal position after the verb and is moved to initial position where it gets focus. Similarly, (9a) communicates the information neutrally, with no special emphasis on any particular aspect of it. (9a) is syntactically simpler than (9b) and (9c) which are cleft constructions. The clefts stress a particular aspect of what is said and each stresses a different one, in (9b) the focus is the subject and in (9c) it is the object. In (10b), there is a case of extraposition of the subject: ‘To teach John’ is placed at end position and the syntactic slot it leaves is filled by a dummy ‘it’. In (10c), the object of the subordinate non-finite clause, ‘John’, is moved to take on the syntactic function of subject of the matrix clause. This is a peculiar case and indeed it is tough to account for its syntactic arrangement because the grammatical subject in (10c) does not satisfy the conditions to take the argument role for the subject in this example. ‘John’ is the syntactic subject but it can only satisfy the conditions to take the argument role of the complement of ‘to teach’.

These marked structures involve a marked distribution of elements to alter the relative degree of informational prominence in the sentence, they convey special focus. Syntactically speaking, these constructions are difficult to account for, but all attempts to account for them try to find out what movements are needed to satisfy the checking operations imposed by the features of lexical items. Indeed, syntactic theory requires that “grammatical elements must be combined and moved (under economy constraints) until a successful derivation is computed.” (Ludlow 2005, 105).

The transformations typical of sentential focus constructions can also be found in phrases and they are useful in assigning informational prominence. Two examples of marked syntactic structures at NP level to assign prominence are (11b) and (12c):

- (11) (a) That stupid question does not deserve an answer.
 (b) That stupid of a question does not deserve an answer.
exchange of modifier-head functions
- (12) (a) The ham sandwich customer is waiting for his check.
 (b) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.
omission and supplantation of the head

In (11b) there is a reassignment of NP grammatical functions. The modifier (adj.: ‘stupid’) takes on the position of head in the root NP and the head of the NP in (11a) becomes, in (11b), head of the NP in the complement phrase which becomes a prepositional phrase (PP) as,

given the rules of syntax, the complement should be introduced by the preposition 'of'. The NP functioning as axis in the PP is singular and thus also needs a determiner, thus 'a' is introduced.

In (12b) there is omission and movement. The lexical head of the root NP is omitted and a nominal element included in the restrictive modifier takes its empty position to fill the slot that cannot be left empty from a syntactic point of view. The lexical head of the root NP is supplanted by a nominal element included in the complement and it becomes the "raised" syntactic subject as it cannot be the notional one.

Examples such as (6), an utterance of (12b), and (13)

- (13) [In a restaurant, a waitress asks another to give the check to several customers that have finished eating and handing her the check of a customer, she utters:] The ham sandwich is at table four.

are identified as novel referential metonymies, that is, as cases in which the referent of the textual NP does not coincide with the referent that the speaker intends as subject (Romero and Soria 2002, 2005b, forthcoming).

For the identification of a referential metonymy, the hearer must detect a non-generic use of a NP, a contextual abnormality, and an aphonic restricted nominal element. In (6), an utterance of (12b), given the VP 'is waiting for his check', the NP functioning as subject is non-generic because 'be waiting for the check' is not a defining characteristic. In addition, there is a contextual abnormality as there is a failure of function-argument application (Borschev and Partee 2001). The normal interpretation of the predicate, 'is waiting for his check', is incompatible with the normal interpretation of the NP, 'the ham sandwich', functioning as its subject. The predicate 'is waiting for his check' selects the argument role [+HUMAN] for the subject and, thus, interlocutors know that the NP, 'the ham sandwich', cannot be the one to satisfy this argument. The interpretation of the sentence is blocked. Abnormality triggers a mandatory_{LT} process of recovery of given information.²⁰ Taking into account that the context, waiters speaking about their customers in a restaurant, reveals that there is a type of entity, customer, which constitutes a piece of given information (Halliday 1985: 275) and that it is marked as [+HUMAN] by the satisfactions conditions imposed by the predicator 'is waiting for his check', it is easy to assume that the topic talked about, a customer, should appear as the argument of the predicate. As it is common ground for speakers and hearers that there are customers to be served in restaurants, 'cus-

²⁰ There is a fundamental difference between metaphor and metonymy. The identification of a novel metonymic use of language leads to the automatic recovery of the non-textual nominal element that the textual one is restricting and with which it has an obvious connection in order to complete the description which allows reference assignment. By contrast, the identification of metaphor triggers the cognitive process of mapping between two domains to generate a shifted context from which to determine the transferred meaning of the terms used in the metaphorical utterances (Romero and Soria 2007).

tomers' will be *given information* for waiters and can be omitted without any risk of misunderstanding; the hearer will easily recognize that it forms a part of the non-textual semantic value of the head of the NP. 'Customer' is recognized as an aphonic restricted nominal element and 'ham sandwich' is recognized as part of the modifier restricting this aphonic element. Thus, 'customer' should be the lexical head in its NP. We realize that this syntactic function is supplanted by 'ham sandwich', which is new information. The omission of 'customer' makes 'ham sandwich' supplant the function of the head of the unmarked NP, 'the ham sandwich customer'. 'The ham sandwich' is identified in (6) as a referential metonymy. The central element that serves to pick out the referent of the expression 'the ham sandwich customer' is, in the context of (6), 'the ham sandwich' as customer is given information and, therefore, can be omitted without any problem of recovery.

Then, the metonymic interpretation of examples like (6) requires the mandatory_{LT} pragmatic process of automatic recovery of the aphonic nominal element it is restricting. By this reconstruction, the content of the empty syntactic element allows the construction of the individual concept needed for the definite description and can fulfill the presupposition requirements of this kind of structure. The semantic value of metonymic NPs allows the adjustment needed to get a full proposition that can be evaluated as true or false.

But not all cases of referential metonymies are like (6). Although identification criteria are shared, the contextual abnormality in (13) is presented in a different form. It is true that in (13), given the predicate 'is at table four', there is a non-generic use of the NP functioning as subject 'the ham sandwich'. In addition, there is a contextual abnormality. In particular, there is a contextual failure by the confrontation between the semantic value of 'the ham sandwich' in a possible usual context and the actual and unusual use of the expression in this specific situation in which interlocutors know that we do not give the bill to a ham sandwich and it is clear that when the waitress uses the expression 'the ham sandwich', she cannot be speaking merely about the ham sandwich in this context. The interpretation of the sentence is blocked. The given information is the same as that of example (6), and thus 'customer' is recognized as an aphonic restricted nominal element and 'ham sandwich' is recognized as part of the modifier restricting this aphonic element. 'The ham sandwich' is also identified in (13) as a referential metonymy. Now, metonymic interpretation requires the mandatory_T pragmatic process of automatic recovery of the aphonic nominal element it is restricting. In cases of this type of referential metonymies, the mandatory process is only truth-conditionally mandated.

In any case, in the metonymic use of language, the NP used metonymically is just part of the modifier of a more complex NP, a singular definite NP with a determiner, that really refers. In this sense, the result of applying the pragmatic process involved in metonymy has a

direct effect in the syntactic structure of this type of utterance, and this serves to show once again that there is a compelling interaction between syntax and pragmatics. These cases can be seen as evidence that the outputs of the language faculty are available at incremental levels and that pragmatic resolution can be involved in sub-sentential fragments of meaning which are going into the construction of sentence-meaning.

4. *Conclusion*

If, as it is argued from phrasal pragmatics, the recovery of unarticulated constituents to determine what is descriptively referred to by incomplete definite descriptions and by referential metonymies depends, in both cases, at least on a truth-conditionally mandatory pragmatic process of recovery of information, the explanation of these phenomena does not justify a contextualist position. Although what is said by the speaker with utterances that include incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymies is not always literally said, as contextualists defend, the process required for their interpretation or its results should not be mandatory in any sense if our proposal were contextualist. But this is precisely what we have argued, that the process for the interpretation of incompleteness of definite descriptions is at least mandatory_T, and thus we do not support the contextualist position on this point.

References

- Bach, K. (2005), "Context ex Machina," In Z.G. Szabó (ed.), *Semantics versus Pragmatics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 15–44.
- Blutner, R. (1998), "Lexical Pragmatics," *Journal of Semantics*, 15, 115–62.
- Borg, E. (forthcoming), "Semantics and the Place of Psychological Evidence," In S. Sawyer (ed.), *New Ways in Philosophy of Language* (Palgrave).
- Borschev, V. and B.H. Partee (2001), "Genitive Modifiers, Sorts, and Metonymy," *Nordic Journal of Linguistics*, 24/2, 140–160.
- Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore (2005), *Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell).
- Carston, R. (2002), *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Carston, R. (2005-unpublished), "Lexical Pragmatics: Is a Unified Account Possible," Talk given at conference on Lexical Pragmatics, Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, 2005.
- Donnellan, K. (1966), "Referente and Definite Descriptions," *Philosophical Review*, 77, 281–304.
- Glanzberg, M. (2005), "Presuppositions, Truth Values, and Expressing Propositions," In G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 349–396.

- Hauser, M.D., N. Chomsky and W.T. Fitch (2002), "The Faculty of Language: What it is, Who has it, and How did it Evolved?" *Science*, 298, 1569–1579.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1985), *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (London, Melbourne, Auckland: Edward Arnold).
- Hofweber, T. (2005), "A Puzzle about Ontology," *NOÛS*, 39/2, 256–283.
- Ludlow, P. (2005), "A Note on Alleged Cases of Nonsentential Assertion," In R. Elugardo and R. Stainton (eds.), *Ellipsis and Nonsentential Speech* (Dordrecht: Springer), 95–108.
- Matsui, T. (2000), *Bridging and Relevance* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins).
- Neale, S. (1990), *Descriptions* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Neale, S. (2005), "Pragmatism and Binding," In Z.G. Szabó (ed.), *Semantics versus Pragmatics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 165–285.
- Neale, S. (2007), "Heavy Hands, Magic and Scene-reading Traps", *EUJAP*, 3/2, 77–132.
- Noveck, I. A. and D. Sperber (eds.), (2004), *Experimental Pragmatics* (London: Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition).
- Recanati, F. (2004), *Literal Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Romero, E. and B. Soria (2002), "La metonimia referencial," *Theoria*, 17/3, 435–455.
- Romero, E. and B. Soria (2005a), "Metaphoric Concepts and Language," In J.J. Acero and P. Leonardi (eds.), *Facets of Concepts* (Padova: Il Poligrafo), 177–200.
- Romero, E. and B. Soria (2005b), "I as a Pure indexical and Metonymy as Language Reduction," In A. Dey et al. (eds.), *Modeling and Using Context: CONTEXT 2005, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence*, 3554 (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag), 436–450.
- Romero, E. and B. Soria (2007), "A View of Novel Metaphor in the Light of Recanati's Proposals," In M.J. Frápolli (ed.), *Saying, Meaning and Referring. Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language* (London: Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition), 145–159.
- Romero, E. and B. Soria (2008), "La Pragmática del Sintagma y las Descripciones Definidas Incompletas," *Episteme NS*, 28/1, 115–138.
- Romero, E. and B. Soria (forthcoming), "Phrasal Pragmatics in Carston's Programme," In B. Soria and E. Romero (eds.), *Explicit Communication: Essays on Robyn Carston's Pragmatics* (London: Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition).
- Schiffer, S. (1987), "The Basis of Reference," *Erkenntnis*, 13, 171–206.
- Slater, C. (1997), "Semantics as Immature Science," In D. Jutronic (ed.) *The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics* (Maribor: Pedagoska Fakulteta), 33–39.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1986/95), *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (2005), "Pragmatics," In F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 468–501.
- Stanley, J. and T. Williamson (1995), "Quantifiers and Context-dependence," *Analysis*, 55, 291–295.

Wilson, D. and R. Carston (2007), "Word Meanings in Context: A Unitary Relevance-Theoretic Account," In M. Aurnague, K. Korta, and J. Larrazabal (eds.) *Language, Representation, and Reasoning: Memorial Volume to Isabel Gómez Txurruka* (Bilbao: University of the Basque Country Press), 283–313.