Challenges to Bach's Pragmatics[1]

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In this paper, we will revise Bach's classification of contents in what is directly meant. That catalogue was introduced to reach an exhaustive characterization of the contents that may appear in what the speaker means; something that cannot be done just with Grice's division between what is said and what is implied. However, Bach's distinction among different types of direct inexplicit contents (explicit, implicit, and figurative) presents some theoretical problems which we think can be avoided if at least the following is considered. First, within what he calls "local completion", a more fine grained distinction between lexical specialization and local completion proper should be established. We suggest that this can be done by resorting to different senses in which a mandatory demand of pragmatic information may be triggered. Cases of lexical specialization will depend on context-sensitive expressions and will require a new notion for explicit contents: expliciture. Second, we argue that metonymy should be considered as an impliciture rather than as a case of figurative content, taking into account that supplementation rather than transfer is the pragmatic strategy involved in the interpretation of metonymic utterances. Third, we defend that in metonymic utterances, the impliciture is based on completion rather than expansion and this entails a refinement of the notion of propositional radical. In this way, our reform leads to a more exhaustive classification, and provides the criteria underlying this catalogue of the ways in which what is directly communicated in an utterance can go beyond sentence meaning.

> "Confusion in terms inspires confusion in concepts. When a relevant distinction is not clearly marked or not marked at all, it is apt to be blurred or even missed altogether in our thinking. This is true in any area of inquiry, pragmatics in particular. No one disputes that there are various ways in which what is communicated in an utterance can go beyond sentence meaning. The problem is to catalog the ways." (Bach 1994a, 124)

With this quotation Kent Bach opens his most famous article on the contents communicated by the speaker, where he introduces his notion of *impliciture,* notion which is a central object of study in pragmatics. Pragmatics is concerned with what speakers do in uttering sentences. Thus, it is concerned with what is communicated or meant; with the contents of speakers' acts of uttering sentences or with "utterance contents".[2] Although Bach's pragmatics includes several types of utterance contents, as he himself says "I am all for pragmatics." (2004, 27), in this paper we are going to focus mainly on implicitures and their delimitation with other contents communicated directly

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[2] As Bach (2012) himself recognises, "utterance content" is sometimes used for the content expressed by an expression, in particular for what is said by a sentence (other ways to call it are "sentence meaning" or "textual meaning"). As the semantic content of a sentence is the subject matter of semantics rather than of pragmatics, "utterance contents" here only stand for the contents of the act carried out by the speaker, for the contents which are the subject matter of pragmatics.

by the speaker, leaving aside the implied contents and the aspects related to the illocutionary acts that accompany all contents communicated.

Indeed, after revising Bach's catalogue of the ways in which what is directly meant goes beyond linguistic meaning, we will consider some problems in it. Inspired by his way of cataloguing them, we will provide more fine grained classificatory criteria coherent with some of our previous proposals, and we will see how applying them gives better results. In particular, we will attend to our previous distinction between two senses of "mandatory", linguistic and truth-conditionally (Romero and Soria 2010a), but in this occasion we will show that, in turn, the linguistic demand may arise lexically or compositionally and the truth-conditional demand may arise in the sentence or just in some utterances of the sentence. Besides, we will show that contents directly meant are distinguished by the recognition of different pragmatic strategies such as lexical specialization, supplementation and transfer. The types of mandatory and the pragmatic strategies allow the following refinement in his catalogue. First, we will make a distinction between two types of examples within what Bach calls local completion and consider only one of them as local completion proper. The other kind of examples, classified by Bach as word completion, are cases of mandatory lexical specialization in which what is missing to make the truth conditions determined cannot be recovered textually. They are a type of context-sensitive expressions. We introduce the notion of *expliciture* to explain homogeneously the cases of disambiguation and context-sensitive expressions. In all the cases of expliciture the demand is mandatory from the lexical point of view. Second, implicitures are recognised by the pragmatic strategy of supplementation and they are based on completion only when the demand is mandatory. The difference between explicitures and implicitures then concerns both the pragmatic strategy, as supplementation is restricted to implicitures, and the type of demand, as in expliciture the mandatory demand is just lexical: a lexical item or word is itself underdeterminate and linguistically demands pragmatic resolution. In local completion proper, the supplementation affects a phrase and the demand is mandatory but not lexically, that is, it may be demanded either both linguistically from a compositional point of view and truth-conditionally from the sentential point of view or just truth-conditionally from the utterance point of view. This allows us to show that there are more cases of propositional radical than those recognised by Bach and leads to the classification of metonymies within local completion rather than expansion. In addition, metonymies and metaphors are compared and classified differently taking into account the different ways in which they go beyond sentence meaning.

All this will be presented in the following order. In the first section, we introduce Bach's classification of the propositional inexplicit contents of speaker's meaning. In the second, we present his notion of *impliciture* and develop a distinction among several mandatory demands of contextual information. In the third, we raise the problems we see in his classification of direct and inexplicit contents and elaborate possible solutions within his theoretical framework. Finally, we provide our conclusions, summarize them in Figure 4, and make some remarks on the consequences of the new catalogue we propose.

1. *Bach's Picture of Pragmatic Contents*

The notion of *impliciture* indicates a distinction that was not previously made in the now classic Gricean distinction of contents. Grice's catalogue of the ways in which what is meant may go beyond linguistic meaning includes, as we can see in Figure 1,

two types of contents: explicit and implied. What is said as a result of disambiguation and reference assignment is considered an explicit content. What is implicated by means of an indirect or a figurative use is considered an implied content.

Figure 1. *Grice's catalogue of utterance contents*

Contents	**Explicit**: what is said as a result of disambiguation and reference assignment
	Implied: what is implicated by means of indirect or figurative uses

According to Bach, there are two possibilities for the pragmatic notion of *what is meant*. In the first possibility, what the speaker means by the uttering of a sentence coincides with what is said by the sentence.[3] In this case, what is meant is conveyed directly and literally. In the second, what the speaker meant by the uttering of a sentence does not coincide with what is said by a sentence. This is, as Bach says, the normal situation in speech because, on the one hand, what is said by a sentence does not have to be a proposition (even with references fixed and ambiguities resolved), a proposition that fixes determinate truth conditions, rather it can be a propositional radical, a syntactically complete form that lacks determinate truth conditions or that is semantically incomplete (2000, 263 n3). On the other hand, even when the meaning of the sentence expresses a proposition, its use can go beyond its meaning. If this is right, Grice's distinction between explicit and implied contents cannot give the exhaustive characterization of the contents that may appear in what the speaker means.

A relevant distinction "not marked" in Grice's catalogue is his wrong consideration of figurative uses of language as uses that convey implied content. Instead, Bach considers that the latter might be better described as speaking figuratively; as direct speech acts that convey figurative inexplicit propositions. In this respect, we could not agree more with Bach (Romero and Soria 2007, 148-9; forthcoming). Furthermore, figurative uses are not the only cases which are not implicatures and in which the speaker does not mean what she says. According to Bach, Grice did not notice that the standard uses of many sentences "go beyond their meanings (even with references fixed and ambiguities resolved) but are not implicatures or figurative uses either." (Bach 2011, 18). Thus, another intermediate phenomenon not marked in Grice's catalogue depends on distinguishing "not only the implied from the explicit but the implicit from the implied." (1994a, 124). Implicit content or impliciture appears between the explicit and the implied.[4]

In Bach's catalogue of inexplicit contents, Figure 2,

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[3] In defence of his semantic notion of saying as opposed to the Gricean notion of what is said or to Recanati's contextual one, both the subject matter of pragmatics, Bach states: "[i]t is a mystery to me why facts about what the hearer does in order to understand what the speaker says should be relevant to what the speaker says in the first place." (Bach 2001a, 156; 2001b, 25).

[4] Although in the literature other notions, such as the contextualist notion of *what is said* by Recanati (2004) or Carston's (2002) notion of *explicature*, are similar to the one added by Bach, these notions consider their contents as explicit. Thus, Bach does not accept their terminology since "the only explanation for the fact that Grice's critics count implicitures as explicit contents of utterances, or identify them with what is said, is that they uncritically assume, along with Grice, that there is no middle ground between what is said and what is implicated." (Bach 1994a, 141).

Figure 2. *Bach's catalogue of inexplicit contents*

Contents (inexplicit)	Direct	Explicit	Disambiguation: 'bank'			LITERAL
			Reference assignment: 'he'			
		Implicit or Implicitures	Completion	Local	Word: 'get', 'with'…	NON-LITERAL
					Phrase: 'Andrea's book', 'Child abuse'…	
				Sentence: 'Bach is coming'		
			Expansion	Local	Word: 'fell'…	
					Phrase: 'The ham sandwich is waiting for his check' (metonymy)	
				Sentence: 'You are not going to die'		
		Figurative: metaphor, metonymy				
	Indirect	**Implied** or implicatures				

we can see clearly that implicit content or implicitures are added to Grice's catalogue between explicit and implied contents (in bold) and that figurative contents have changed their theoretical position.

Thus, when what the speaker meant by the uttering of a sentence does not coincide with what is said by a sentence, what is meant can be conveyed in many different ways but, in these cases, the communicated contents are always inexplicit. Inexplicit contents, as we can see in Figure 2, can be communicated in three ways as a result of the combination of two different ways in which the inexplicit contents of an utterance may be divided. First, we may distinguish between direct and indirect contents (second column in Figure 2); and second, we may distinguish between literal and non-literal contents (last column in Figure 2). This, according to Bach, yields three possibilities: what is literally and directly communicated, what is non-literally and directly communicated, and what is non-literally and indirectly communicated.

When contents are communicated *literally and directly* and mutually salient contextual information to get reference assignment and disambiguation is demanded, explicit contents are said to be obtained both in Grice's and Bach's catalogues (marked in bold in their respective figures). The criterion used by Bach to consider that these cases communicate contents which are at the same time inexplicit and explicit is that what is said, the meaning of the sentence, coincides partially with what is meant and the inexplicit cannot be made explicit by inserting the missing portions in what is expressed. Context-sensitive expressions characteristically generate these cases.

Inexplicit contents can also be communicated *non-literally and directly*. In these cases, the speaker means not what is said but an elaboration of what is said and two types are distinguished: implicitures and figurative contents. In cases of figurative uses of words, the information conveyed is different because some words do not contribute with their encoded meaning in the figurative content. In impliciture, instead,

> one says something but does not mean that; rather, what one means includes an implicit qualification on what one says, something that one could have made explicit but did not. (Bach 2001c: 252)

Nonliterality in impliciture is a matter of leaving words out. The criterion used by Bach to consider implicitures in general as communicated contents which are at the same time inexplicit and implicit is that what is said, the meaning of the sentence, does not coincide with what is meant, it is built out of what is said and includes implicit additional information which is not, but could have been, explicitly expressed. When

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mutually salient contextual information is truth-conditionally demanded in an impliciture, the impliciture is based on completion; if not, it is based on expansion.

Finally, inexplicit contents can be communicated *non-literally and indirectly*. The speaker means what is said (or an elaboration of what is said) and something else as well (1994a, 144). This happens in examples in which implicatures (implied contents)[5] or in indirect speech acts are involved.

Bach's extension of Grice's picture is an important step forward to clarify the different nature of the communicated contents by utterances, above all, by means of his elaborated contribution in the field of implicitures as part of speaker's meaning. The next section is devoted to their characterization and to the examination of the criterion used to divide the subtypes of implicitures.

2. *Implicitures and Two Senses of Mandatory*

An impliciture is a propositional content built out of what is said that includes implicit additional conceptual material which could have been textually expressed within what is said. The pragmatic process of figuring out implicit contents has an obligatory demand in completion and an optional demand in expansion.

Completion is the filling in of a propositional radical; a logical form expressed by a semantically underdeterminate expression (word, phrase, or sentence). Completion arises whenever an utterance of a sentence, even after disambiguation and reference fixing, does not by virtue of its linguistic meaning express a proposition. Understanding an utterance of a sentence that is semantically underdeterminate requires a process of completion to arrive at a full proposition, at something with determinate truth conditions, conditions that permit its evaluation. The demand of pragmatic information to achieve completion is mandatory from a truth-conditional point of view.

Expansion is the fleshing out of the minimal proposition (logical form expressed by a semantically determinate sentence or a propositional radical filled by completion). Due to the lack of relevant specificity of the minimal proposition, the demand of pragmatic information to achieve expansion is optional from a truth-conditional point of view, there is sentence nonliterality and some other proposition, yielded by a process of expansion, is directly communicated by the speaker.

In sum, there are two ways in which a speaker can mean something implicitly and this depends on whether the demand for the pragmatic process to get implicit content is mandatory or optional. As Bach says:

> Because the utterance of a semantically underdeterminate sentence leaves out a conceptual element (or a relation between conceptual elements), the process of completion is required before a proposition is yielded. The process of expansion is not required in this sense—it is mandated not conceptually but merely pragmatically. (1994a, 133)

He illustrates both demands with a normal utterance of (1)

(1) Everybody is coming.

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[5] The implicit is different from the implied in the sense that, in the former, the content is implicit within the proposition expressed while an implicature is, for Bach, an additional proposition external to what is directly meant.

Sentence (1) means what its words mean, meaning that constitutes what is said by the sentence. What is said by (1) underdetermines what the speaker means, it is a propositional radical. By contrast, what is meant by the speaker must be complete. A conceptual portion is required, although it is not linguistically demanded, to obtain a proposition. No utterance of (1) communicates a proposition if the place to which everybody is coming is not established. Completion might supply the missing portions to yield (1a),

(1a) EVERYBODY IS COMING [TO MY PARTY].

a complete proposition. Nevertheless, the minimal proposition that everybody is coming to the speaker's party lacks relevant specificity (Bach 2000, 265) and thus with the normal utterance of (1) the speaker does not mean just (1a). In this case, it is appropriate to expand (1a) to ascertain what the speaker means. In a normal context, 'every' would refer to a more restricted set of individuals that the speaker would like to invite such as her class mates. (1a) is expanded to yield (1b),

(1b) EVERYBODY {IN MY CLASS} IS COMING [TO MY PARTY].[6]

the proposition intended by the speaker which includes the conceptual portion that restores the lack of relevant specificity of (1a). The mutually salient contextual information is not truth-conditionally demanded, it is optional.

Both completion and expansion are sub-classified in different types depending on their occurrence either at sentence level or at local level (lexical or phrasal level). In the interpretation of the utterance of (1), completion is at sentence level, while expansion is at local level (a restriction of a quantifier). Let's see the possibilities he provides.

Sentence completion is needed to interpret (1) since with (1) we just get a propositional radical due to its incompleteness at sentence level. But sometimes the propositional radical is due to incompleteness at local level, and local completion, insertion of additional material, fills in an "incomplete conceptual portion" that is expressed by a semantically underdeterminate lexical item or phrase. When the incompleteness is due to a word, *lexical completion* is needed and it is a matter of filling in by pragmatic specialization of the semantically underdeterminate word.[7] An example can be given with the words 'get' and 'in' in (2i-ii).

(2) i. You'll *get* a sandwich *in* a bag

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[6] From now on, we will use square and curly brackets to indicate completion and expansion respectively as Bach himself does. However, unlike what Bach does, what we add is attached to the propositional form and, thus, it is also in small capitals to reinforce the idea that this is conceptual material rather than the linguistic expression that would convey that material if expressed. The speaker may utter the words that express the concepts in brackets so that what the speaker meant can be made explicit, although, as Bach says, "the exact words don't matter" (2000, 263). In this way, it becomes clearer that what is added is not part of the original sentence or its meaning and that it only indicates part of what the speaker meant in uttering it; it is an "unarticulated constituent" in the proposition since it is not expressed by the sentence.

[7] As Bach (2006) has recognized, sometimes it is not easy to tell whether a sentence is semantically complete or incomplete. This problem is shown, for example, when Bach (1994a, 152-53) considers first that 'take' may involve pragmatic specialization (local expansion) and later, in Bach (2007, 33), as a case of lexical completion, in the same way as 'put', 'at', 'before', 'in', 'on' and 'to' due to its lexical underdetermination.

ii. You'll *get* a good idea *in* an hour

'Get' and 'in' in (2) do not require disambiguation, rather, each has a single sense that needs the intended "pragmatic specialization" (Bach 1994a, 151). We invoke extralinguistic knowledge, about sandwiches and bags and about ideas and temporal intervals, to interpret (2i) and (2ii) in the way we do. It is not a semantic fact that one is not likely to mean with (2ii), for example, that the interlocutor physically placed something in sometime. By contrast, when the incompleteness is due to the meaning of a phrase, phrase completion is needed. Phrase completion is a matter of filling in by pragmatic specialization of semantically underdeterminate phrases such as the genitive construction. (3) is semantically underdeterminate

(3) Andrea's book is on the table.

due to the phrase 'Andrea's book'. Unless it is enriched, an utterance of (3) "is, as Sperber and Wilson (1986) observe, 'less than fully propositional' (p. 188)." (Bach 1994a, 151). 'Andrea's book' may stand for several relations between Andrea and book and which book the speaker is talking about will be unknown until the relation between them is identified. According to Bach (1994a, 150 n19), certain sorts of phrases such as adjective-noun (e.g. 'happy days') and noun-noun phrases (e.g. 'child abuse') are also underdeterminate phrases that need filling in. How it is taken depends on one's extralinguistic knowledge.[8]

Expansion can also happen at two levels. It happens at sentence level, when expansion of a minimal proposition is required as in the interpretation of examples like (4)

(4) You are not going to die.

when uttered by a mother whose son is crying for a minor cut. In this case what the speaker means, (4a),

(4a) YOU$_X$ ARE NOT GOING TO DIE {FROM THIS CUT}.

is a qualified version of what the sentence means (Bach 2000, 263). It happens at local level, when expansion fleshes out a minimal proposition adding conceptual material to specialize some concept that intervenes in it. Lexical and phrasal expansions can be distinguished and exemplified by means of pragmatic supplementation in interpreting a normal utterance of (5) or in interpreting normal utterances of (6)-(8)

(5) The thief fell to the floor when ordered to.
(6) Everyone went to the wedding.
(7) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.
(8) The cupboard is bare.

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[8] The examples considered here depend on what Bach calls "constituent underdetermination". Nevertheless, completion may also arise due to structural underdetermination (see, for example, 1994b, 268; 2007, 33).

In these cases what the speaker means is a qualified version of what the sentence means, as indicated in (5a)-(8a),

(5a) THE THIEF FELL TO THE FLOOR {INTENTIONALLY} WHEN ORDERED TO.
(6a) EVERYONE {IN MY FAMILY} WENT TO THE WEDDING.
(7a) THE HAM SANDWICH {CUSTOMER} IS WAITING FOR HIS CHECK.
(8a) THE CUPBOARD {IN THIS HOUSE} IS BARE.

although it is not the meaning of the sentence what is qualified but the meaning of a word, 'fell' in (5), or of a phrase, 'everyone', 'the ham sandwich', 'the cupboard', in (6)-(8) respectively.

Bach recognizes that he does not put all that much weight on the distinction between implicitures that involve completion or expansion "since there does not seem to be much difference between what is required to understand implicitures of either sort." (2010, 132). In both cases, the process of figuring out what is implicit is essentially the same. The difference is that in cases of completion the pragmatic process of supplementation of missing conceptual material has a mandatory (truth-conditional) demand, while in cases of expansion it has an optional demand.

Although he is right when he says that the process of recovering implicit material is essentially the same and says that completion is more controversial (2000, 263 n3), we believe that the distinction between completion and expansion or better, the distinction between mandatory and optional deserves more attention if we want to catalogue the different types of communicated contents rightly.

The demarcation between optional and mandatory is not easy to trace. For example, according to Recanati (2004), the distinction should be made in the following fashion. The demand of a pragmatic process is obligatory if it is linguistic and, thus, the process is bottom-up. It is optional if it is not linguistic and, thus, the process is top-down. This neat distinction is, however, blurred when he introduces another characterization of mandatory: a pragmatic process is mandatory if it is necessary for a propositional content to be present in the interpretation of an utterance (2004, 62). The two characterizations of "mandatory" do not determine the same kind of phenomena[9] since in order to have a propositional content, a process can be mandated truth-conditionally, and yet not be bottom-up, as it happens in Bach's completion cases. In these examples there is an incomplete propositional content which is not obtained by the use of any linguistic form indicating that a bottom-up pragmatic process is needed, but which indicates that, since it does not fix determinate truth conditions, a top-down process of recovery of conceptual material is obligatorily demanded to obtain a full proposition.

This reveals that in order to understand in what sense a demand of implicit content can be mandatory, it is necessary to distinguish at least between two senses of "mandatory": linguistic or truth-conditional. This entails a more complex distinction between mandatory and optional that depends on considering that processes of interpretation are triggered optionally when they are neither linguistically nor truth-conditionally demanded (Romero and Soria 2010a, 72). In Figure 3,

Figure 3. *Two senses of mandatory*

Mandatory$_L$	Mandatory$_T$	Examples

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[9] In Romero and Soria (2007 and 2010a), we have already noted this problem in Recanati's work.

+	+	*He* is asleep
+	_	*Moreover,* Bill is honest
_	+	Bill is coming
_	_	You are not going to die

we distinguish the two senses of "mandatory": mandatory from a linguistic point of view (mandatory$_L$ from now on) and mandatory from a truth-conditional point of view (mandatory$_T$ from now on). As a result of the combination of these two senses of "mandatory", we may distinguish among three possibilities in which the demand is mandatory (marked in the three first lines). Sometimes, the demand is mandatory in the two senses, as when pronouns are involved. In (9)

(9) He is asleep.

the demand is mandatory$_L$, since the linguistic meaning of the pronoun 'he' sets up a variable to be pragmatically filled. It is also mandatory$_T$ because, without the saturation process, there are no determinate truth conditions that allow an evaluation of the proposition communicated by the speaker. In this sense, when reference assignment is involved, the demand to reach contents which are at the same time inexplicit and explicit is mandatory$_{LT}$.

Sometimes, the demand is mandatory$_L$ but not mandatory$_T$. In using 'moreover' in an utterance of (10)

(10) Moreover, Bill is honest.

one is indicating that one is adding something to what was previously said (Bach 1999, 341). The meaning of 'moreover' sets up a variable to be pragmatically filled with what was previously stated, but it is not needed in order to have a minimal proposition by means of the utterance of 'Bill is honest'.

In other occasions, the demand is mandatory$_T$ but not mandatory$_L$. The well-formed sentence 'Bill is coming' does not have a linguistic trigger, but if a locative, [TO MY PARTY] for example, is not recovered, there is no proposition. Thus, there is a mandatory$_T$ demand that triggers a pragmatic process of completion. In this case, completion is just truth-conditionally demanded.

Finally, there are processes that are not obligatorily triggered in any of these senses. An utterance of the well-formed sentence (4), 'You are not going to die', expresses a minimal proposition but as it lacks relevance specificity, it must be expanded. Expansion is optional since it is neither linguistically nor truth-conditionally demanded.

These clarifications about the notions used by Bach to classify contents do not avoid some problems in his classification. We will see three of them in the next section. We also see that if we want to work them out, we will need to show that each sense of "mandatory", in turn, may be divided in two types. The linguistic demand may arise lexically or compositionally and the truth-conditional demand may arise in the sentence or just in some utterances of the sentence. This yields more possibilities in which the demand is mandatory and, as we will see, some of them will allow the solution to some of the problems.

3. *Some problems in Bach's Catalogue and tentative solutions: Refining his Notion of Impliciture*

The first problem appears when we consider Bach's characterization of explicit inexplicit contents as contents that are communicated literally and directly together with his following statement

> (…) it seems that we should include local completion, along with disambiguation and reference assignment, among the pragmatic processes that enter into the determination of the explicit content of an utterance. (1994a, 152).

This means that the kind of implicit contents that results from local completion should also contribute to the determination of the explicit but then, in Bach's approach, some implicit contents, which are also considered non-literal, are at the same time explicit and literal contents.

The question is how it is possible for implicit elements based on local completion to be considered also as explicit, and then as literal and non-literal contents at the same time. In our opinion, the problem is raised because the parallelism between some examples of local completion and the examples of the processes to assign semantic value to context-sensitive expressions is stronger than between the former and the rest of the cases of impliciture based on completion. An important characteristic of implicitures is that some words (which could have been said but were not) are left out (Bach 1994a: 135), in this sense they are non-literal. However, there are cases of what he classifies as local completion in which the demanded conceptual material cannot be obtained by adding some words to the explicit part and thus they are difficult to be considered as non-literal. Hence, a typical characteristic of impliciture does not apply to these cases. As tentative solution to this problem, we will propose, in section 3.1, a new notion, the notion of *expliciture*, which is meant to include these cases within the explicit inexplicit contents communicated literally and directly.

The second problem, whose solution will be dealt with in section 3.2, is related with the explanation of metonymy. Metonymies, as cases of speaking directly in a nonliteral way (Bach and Harnish 1979), are inconsistently explained by Bach (1994a) as figurative contents and, at the same time, as implicitures based on local expansion. He says that metonymies (and metaphor) "involve the figurative use of any particular word or phrase" (1994a, 135) and "instead of building on what the speaker has made explicit [as in implicitures], the hearer infers a distinct proposition." (1994a, 154-55). As he speaks about the local process of metonymic transfer (1994a, 158), at least in his discussion on metonymy with Recanati, Bach seems to follow the classic conception of metonymy as a figurative use that involves transfer. According to the transfer account, in a metonymic utterance of (7), in which 'ham sandwich' is used by a waiter to refer to a customer who ordered a ham sandwich, the speaker, by using 'the ham sandwich', refers to a person and this is possible because with "ham sandwich" the speaker denotes figuratively, through transfer, the derived property expressed by 'ham sandwich customer'. However, he also argues for metonymy as a non-literal use at the level of phrase that is interpreted by means of a process of local expansion (1994a, 152), what he called "the expansionary account" of metonymy (1994a, 158). Local expansion is involved because, he argues, the sentence nonliterality is attributable to the use of a specific expression. While in the examples of expansions at sentence level there is no particular phrase whose nonliteral use triggers the expansion of the minimal proposition (see the interpretation of the utterance of (4) above), in the metonymic utterance of (7),

the nonliterality is due to the use of the expression 'the ham sandwich' and its meaning is what must be expanded, as it is marked in (7a).

Although both explanations have the advantage of rejecting the Gricean view of metonymy as implicature (Grice 1989), we still consider relevant to question whether metonymic utterances communicate implicit or transferred contents under the assumption that they are two mutually exclusive options. Without taking into account that he explicitly said that "impliciture is not a case of using particular words in some figurative ways" (1994a, 126), Bach told us that he did not see any real contrast between these two explanations, and thus there is no need to choose one of them.[10] Ultimately, he would consider that cases of impliciture based on local expansion can be explained as cases of transfer. Nevertheless, in our opinion, Bach's alternative explanations are not equivalent in their theoretical assumptions and, what is worse, prevent a homogeneous characterization of the cases of transfer. Cases of local expansion can be explained as cases of transfer, but there are cases of transfer that cannot be explained as expanded contents. We will argue that, to avoid this situation, it is better to resort to the impliciture account of metonymy.

The third problem appears in relation to the expansionary account of metonymy. If local expansion is involved in interpreting the metonymic utterance of (7), it is because Bach thinks that (7), like (4), is not a semantically underdeterminate sentence. Indeed, he thinks that (7) is associated with an absurd proposition that triggers the "local process" of expansion and, for that matter, keeps it from being triggered in a case like (11)

(11) The ham sandwich is getting eaten.

However, we have serious doubts about whether there is always a full proposition expressed by the uttered sentence in the metonymic cases, and thus we have serious doubts that they trigger a process of local expansion. This problem is related to the fact that the criteria to distinguish between a propositional radical and a proposition are uncertain. The boundaries of this distinction are important to decide if metonymy requires, as Bach says, expansion or if, as we say, it demands completion. The solution to this problem, dealt with in section 3.3, entails the determination of when a propositional form is a propositional radical and what are the different types of demand for contextual information that may be involved in completion so that a full proposition is obtained. A clarification on this point will also serve to establish a better way to distinguish completion and expansion.

3.1 Explicit Local Completion (Mandatory$_{LT}$ Specialization): Towards the Notion of Expliciture

Contrary to what it might seem, the first problem is not just a terminological one. For Bach, reference assignment would be in our terminology mandatory$_{LT}$ and local completion at lexical level would be simply mandatory$_{T}$. However, he must think there is one sense in which they are alike when he expounds the cases of implicit local completion as cases that should be included among the pragmatic processes that enter into the determination of the explicit content of an utterance.

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[10] This was one of the comments that Bach verbally made when we presented our proposals in the Mental Phenomena course (Dubrovnik, 2011).

An example of lexical completion given by Bach is the use of 'get' in examples (2). The linguistic meaning of 'get' marks that any use of this expression must complete its meaning if, with it, we want to fix a truth-evaluable proposition; 'get' is "semantically underdeterminate" and demand pragmatic specialization "for a determinate proposition to be *expressed*" (1994a, 152, our emphasis). This means that 'get' contributes to the proposition explicitly only partially. However, there are no words that could have made the pragmatic specialization required explicit. Thus, we think there is no way of justifying its nonliterally. The linguistic meaning of 'get' makes it a context-sensitive expression. This is similar to what happens in the reference assignment of the pronoun 'he' in (9). Both expressions 'he' and 'get' demand truth-conditionally the contextual information to determine their respective semantic values and, due to the textures of their linguistic meanings, they also demand linguistically this contextual information. As the result of the subpropositional pragmatic specialization, the proposition is more explicit than implicit and, thus, we might call this type of content "expliciture" rather than "impliciture". Reference assignment and this type of local completion, lexical specialization, have in common the type of demand (mandatory$_{LT}$). Unlike what happens in cases of semantically underdeterminate sentences, in lexical specialization cases, the gaps in the utterances correspond to something in the sentences themselves.

Another example of local completion with a similar problem but which is, according to Bach, at the level of phrase is the genitive construction marked by means of ''s'. Nevertheless, we cannot add something explicitly to, for example, the meaning of 'Andrea's book' so that the relation marked by the genitive morpheme ''s' becomes explicit. We can only assign a value to the context-sensitive expression ''s'. 'Andrea's book' rather than being a case of underdeterminate phrase, seems to be the kind of context-sensitive expression with a variable. For us, it is a case of expliciture since the genitive morpheme is a context-sensitive expression which sets up a variable to be pragmatically filled and this makes it even more similar to pronouns than to examples of lexical specialization such as 'get'.

All this leads us to think that it would be more adequate to consider these cases of alleged "local completion" as cases of expliciture since lexical underdetermination is due to a type of context-sensitive expressions. In virtue of their lexical meaning, they demand conceptual information mandatorily to make the truth conditions determined but that information cannot be recovered textually. Thus, when we recover the contents directly communicated by means of sentences that include this type of context-sensitive expressions, the contents are explicit rather than implicit. We include into the determination of the explicit content of an utterance any pragmatic process that enters into the determination of what is literally expressed even if it needs some sort of lexical specialization. And this is equally the case in disambiguation, reference assignment, or mandatory lexical specialization. Thus, the latter should not be considered as examples of local completion, in the new catalogue, they are, we suggest, cases of expliciture rather than of impliciture.

Once we have excluded mandatory$_{LT}$ lexical specialization from local completion, there is no problem in saying that local completion is characterised as part of what is directly and non-literally meant (in concert with Bach 2005, 25) because some words are left out. In this way, we should maintain "local completion" only for the examples that fall strictly under the definition of the term. However, as we will see in section 3.3, although the demand for local completion may also be linguistic and not just truth-conditional, it would be mandatory$_L$ from a compositional point of view and not due to the meaning of a morpheme or a lexical item.

There are several criteria to determine that something is incomplete: context-sensitive lexical expressions and underdetermination of complex expressions. The first is useful for word or morphemic level, the second for structured expressions in which a conceptual portion is missing.[11] Underdetermination may arise in phrases and clauses although their words do not have an underdeterminate meaning. As we will see in 3.3, we may add more ways in which underdetermination of complex expressions may appear, such as the lack of semantic coordination, to get an incomplete proposition.

3.2 Metonymy as impliciture rather than transfer

As we have said, for Bach, metonymy is an impliciture based on expansion and, at the same time, a case of figurative content. Although he does not find it problematic, these two different positions, in our opinion, are not fully consistent with each other. Bach's alternative explanations are not equivalent in their assumptions and prevent a homogeneous characterization of the cases of transfer.

As evidence of this, let us see how the two explanations of the metonymic use of 'I' are not comparable. According to the transfer account, the speaker's use of 'I' in (12)

(12) I am parked out back.

refers to a car and this is possible because 'I' denotes, through transfer, the derived property expressed by 'car I drive'. According to the expansionary account, by contrast, the speaker's use of 'I' in (12) refers to the speaker and what is said by (12) is an absurd proposition that triggers the local expansion of 'I'. The semantic value of 'I' is the explicit part of the communicated complex concept that intervenes in the impliciture the speaker communicates with (12); it is a fragment of the complex concept CAR I_X DRIVE. What we want to highlight here is that, while with this explanation, it is possible to account for the metonymic use of 'I' without thinking that this expression is not a pure indexical (Romero and Soria 2005a), with the first explanation we would have to avoid such theoretical position on indexicals.

Moreover, not all cases of transfer admit an alternative expansionary account. What would be the local expansion to interpret the metaphorical utterance of (13)?

(13) You are the ribbon around my life.

Metaphor cannot be made explicit by adding missing conceptual portions. In metaphor, the strategy of supplementation does not work, we need a derived meaning and transfer must be considered in order to account for the derivation of the metaphorical derived meaning. Thus, considering the examples of local expansion as examples of transfer of meaning leads us to lose sight of this asymmetry (against Bach's attitude in our initial quotation). It does not make sense to understand all cases of expansion as transfer and to lose the distinction between two different pragmatic strategies.

To provide an adequate classification of direct contents, we need to consider that it is peculiar of metonymy that the explicit constituent be considered as qualifier of the missing portion, while it is peculiar of metaphor that there be a conceptual contrast to

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[11] There is another criterion to determine that something is incomplete that is related to structural underdetermination or that appears when the scope of an expression needs to be assigned. As we indicated in n8 above, completion may also arise due to structural underdetermination.

get a transferred meaning. These peculiarities indicate that the unusual use of an expression, presented both in metonymy and in metaphor, is interpreted in a different way. With metonymy some sub-propositional information is added and the pragmatic strategy is the typical of implicitures, that of recovering conceptual material or supplementation; with metaphorical utterances, some sub-propositional information is changed from the linguistic meaning into a derived piece of information (Romero and Soria 2005b), and the pragmatic strategy is transfer. Although in both cases there is an elaboration of what is said, in the impliciture account, what the speaker means includes, in one way or another, what the sentence says while, in the transfer account, the speaker means something different from what the encoded meanings of its sentence predict, something that Bach (1994a, 154-55) supports.

We think that failing to keep these two pragmatic strategies apart leads to a misleading fuzzy boundary between implicitures and figurative contents. Metaphor and metonymy should be kept apart in the catalogue as they do not share the same pragmatic strategy. What is more, we need choosing the proposal of metonymy as impliciture to avoid the theoretical commitment of the explanation of metonymies as cases of transfer and to permit a clear boundary between implicitures and transferred contents.

We have defended a similar proposal on novel metonymy for a long time, although we do not call the content communicated by a metonymy "impliciture". For us, it is a case of missing constituents and not a case of transfer:[12]

> metonymy is not a trope but a case of missing constituents […]. The concept expressed by the first noun phrase included in (7) [a metonymic utterance of (7) in this paper], THE HAM SANDWICH, must be completed as, for example, in THE HAM SANDWICH CUSTOMER. (Romero and Soria 2010b, 188)

In this sort of cases, we need the adding of implicit conceptual material or "unarticulated constituent"[13] to get the complex concepts. In (7a), the unarticulated constituent is CUSTOMER. Still, the similitude between Bach's proposal and ours does not go too far as he considers that metonymy requires local expansion and, thus, demands the conceptual material optionally while, for us, the demand is at least mandatory$_T$ and thus, if using his terminology, we would classify it as a case of local phrasal completion. In this way, we defend that the notion of *impliciture* is of great use for an explanation of metonymy but that Bach's proposal on metonymy as local expansion, although being better than Bach's proposal on metonymy as transfer, is also inadequate.

3.3 Metonymy as completion rather than expansion

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[12] In Romero and Soria (2005a), we have argued that metonymy is not really a case of transfer; metonymy does not exploit a transferred meaning. In Romero and Soria (2010a, 2010b) we develop our position.

[13] The unarticulated constituents mentioned in the literature are similar to the implicit conceptual material (see n6 above). The difference is that they have always been considered as the result of a pragmatic process of free enrichment, while the implicit conceptual material is not always optional for Bach. Recanati (2010) has recently defended that unarticulated constituents do not form a part of the proposition communicated by the speaker, of what the speaker says, but of the situation in which it gets evaluated.

According to Bach's expansionary account, the metonymic utterance of (7) expresses by virtue of its linguistic meaning a full though absurd proposition that has to be extended at local level. There is no underdetermination in any of the expressions used in (7). It is on this point that we raise our main objection to Bach's view of metonymy as a local expansion: we disagree with the proposal that (7) is not semantically underdetermine. In our opinion, (7) cannot express a proposition with determinate truth conditions because, as far as our linguistic competence is concerned, 'to wait' is the type of action that requires an animate agent, something that the ham sandwich isn't. It is questionable, to say the least, that something absurd can fix determinate truth conditions. Indeed, it is difficult to think about the facts of the matter in the world that can be a sandwich waiting for the check. Even if syntactically speaking 'the ham sandwich' is the subject of the clause 'the ham sandwich is waiting for his check', semantically speaking, 'the ham sandwich' does not coordinate with the predicate.

To explain this a bit more, we can resort to Bach (1999)'s idea of the lack of semantic coordination that he introduces to explain what he calls "utterance modifiers". For Bach,

> utterance modifiers, as opposed to sentence modifiers, (…) do not modify the content of the sentence but instead characterize the act of uttering it.(…) In other words, although they are syntactically coordinate with the rest of the sentence, they are not semantically coordinate with it. (1999, 269)

With utterance modifiers, he accepts that there can be lack of semantic coordination between parts of the sentence and that, when this happens, the uncoordinated element does not contribute to the truth conditions expressed by the sentence. There are different types of utterances modifiers. Some of them are like example (10) above. In these cases the uncoordinated element, 'moreover', triggers, by means of its lexical meaning, a pragmatic process to saturate a variable with what was previously stated since its meaning indicates that one is adding it to what is stated by uttering the sentence 'Bill is honest'. The demand of contextual information triggered by 'moreover' is mandatory$_L$ and arises lexically, as it happens with context-sensitive expressions, but is not mandatory$_T$.

Examples, (14)-(15),

(14) *Frankly*, the road had a very poor surface.
(15) *Because you will find out any way*, your wife is having an affair.

also include in italics cases of utterance modifiers. Bach would recognise (14)-(15) as showing lack of coordination between its semantic parts. The demand of contextual information by the utterance modifiers included in (14) and (15) is also mandatory$_L$ but it arises compositionally. In (14), for example, the adverb phrase 'frankly' appears together with the clause 'the road had a very poor surface', and the composition of their meanings is not possible as no resulting meaning is available to obtain an acceptable compositional meaning; the normal interpretation of the sentence, 'the road had a very poor surface', cannot be modified by the manner adverbial 'frankly'. The meaning of 'frankly' typically selects a verbal action such as saying or telling and, thus, interlocutors know that there is an incompatibility between 'frankly' and 'the road had a very poor surface' in (14) which causes a semantic orphanage of the manner adverbial and triggers a mandatory pragmatic process demanded linguistically from a compositional point of view by the lack of coordination of the meaning of 'frankly'

with the rest of (14). The hearer will easily recognize that FRANKLY operates, so to speak, at one level up as a modifier of the speech act of assertion[14] although it cannot contribute to the semantic value of the proposition expressed by 'the road had a very poor surface'. In (15), the *because*-clause is not being used to express an explanation of the information in the matrix clause. Rather, the speaker is using the *because*-clause to explain his speech act of informing the hearer of the fact expressed by the matrix clause.

In our view, in (7), there is also a lack of semantic coordination between the predicate 'is waiting for his check' and the NP occupying the syntactic slot of the subject. This would simply mean that, as in Bach's examples of lack of semantic coordination, the semantic content of 'the ham sandwich' is not coordinate with the semantic content of the rest of the sentence. The difference with utterance modifiers is that in (7) the level up is at phrasal rather than sentential level, and a minimal proposition is not available.[15] That is, the demand of contextual information is not only mandatory$_L$ and arises compositionally, but also mandatory$_T$.

Semantically speaking, the verb 'to wait' needs an animate subject and there is no candidate expression in (7) to act as such, thus, no determinate truth conditions are obtained until a pragmatic process takes place. In different utterances of (7), different pragmatic processes may be demanded; it may be a process by means of which the ham sandwich gets animated and the world is conceived fictionally, or a process of supplementation with some missing conceptual portions which are clearly salient in the context to refer to somebody by means of a metonymy, or a process to get a transferred metaphorical meaning for 'ham sandwich' to describe somebody figuratively. All these adjustments result in an animated subject to get determinate truth conditions. The hearer can recognize one of these possible uses of the expression 'the ham sandwich' when it occurs in subject position and "the predicate is *not plausibly applicable* to" (Bach 1994a, 153; our emphasis) the ham sandwich. What we wonder here is how, if it is "not plausibly applicable", the sentence can, before a pragmatic process of shifting the world, or of supplementation of the conceptual material or of transfer, fix determinate truth conditions. We do not think we have an absurd minimal proposition in which the ham sandwich would be its "subject". Rather, the subject does not coordinate semantically with the predicate and this obligatorily triggers a pragmatic process to obtain a proposition with determinate truth conditions.

If (7), a syntactically complete sentence, is used metonymically, then it expresses a propositional radical in so far as "the entire content of the sentence lacks at least one constituent needed for it to be true or false" (Bach 2006, 436). The semantic content of 'the ham sandwich' is not coordinate with the rest of the sentence, but operates, so to speak, at one level up in the more complex propositional constituent THE HAM SANDWICH [CUSTOMER]. As a result, it coordinates with the content of the rest of the sentence. This would make example (7), when 'the ham sandwich' is used metonymically, be considered as an impliciture based on completion rather than expansion. It needs the adding of constituents of a complex concept in a propositional

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[14] We call this type of adverbials "speech acts adverbials" (Romero and Soria 2010c).

[15] The lack of semantic coordination is just an indicator that the semantic components in the sentence need pragmatic adjustment of any sort to make their contribution to a proposition but that it is not peculiar of a particular type of pragmatic process. Various types of examples such as utterance modifiers, metonymies and metaphors can be said to show this feature and they must be characterised very differently in other important aspects, even from the point of view of their identification.

radical to get determinate truth conditions. Thus, CUSTOMER should not be represented in curly brackets as in (7a) but in square brackets as in (7b)

(7b) THE HAM SANDWICH [CUSTOMER] IS WAITING FOR HIS CHECK.

This explication reveals why the metonymic utterance of (7) triggers the local pragmatic process of supplementation mandatorily and (11) does not.

However, Bach's use of propositional radical is, in our opinion, too restrictive as for him it includes only the cases in which what is built up from the syntactically well-formed sentence "lacks at least one constituent needed for it to be true or false and to be the content of a thought or a statement (alternatively, a sentence might not be fully determinate as to logical form, e.g., as to scope)." (2006, 436). It seems reasonable to think that sentence (7), used metaphorically or used in fictional discourse, also expresses a propositional radical, a complete form from a syntactic point of view that must be pragmatically adjusted to get determinate truth conditions. Thus, a syntactically complete sentence expresses a propositional radical when the sentence fails to express a proposition in every possible utterance of that sentence, although the different utterances of some syntactically complete sentences that fail to express a proposition not always demand a pragmatic process of supplementation, as it happens with (7).

But this is not the only reason why we think the definition of propositional radical is too restrictive. In our opinion, a sentence may express a proposition while one of its utterances doesn't. We acknowledge that this is far from obvious, and cases such as the unusual and metonymic utterance of (16)

(16) The ham sandwich is at table four.

will serve to show what we mean. A metonymic utterance of (16), would be for example, when a waitress asks another to give the check to several customers in a restaurant that have finished eating and, handing her the check of one of them, she makes use of this sentence. In this utterance of (16), the speaker refers metonymically to a particular customer and not to a ham sandwich. If the speaker does not want to refer to a sandwich, her utterance does not express a full proposition by means of (16). Only if the semantic presuppositions that are triggered by (16) are the case, the sentence expresses determinate truth conditions and does not leave out a conceptual element. One of these semantic presuppositions is triggered by 'the ham sandwich' according to which when it is used, it is to talk about a ham sandwich. If this presupposition failed, the propositional form expressed by the sentence would not be a proposition, and the demand of the conceptual element would not be mandated merely pragmatically. In this way, we could say that with the particular use of (16) to refer to a particular customer, the speaker does not express a full proposition with the sentence meaning, but a propositional radical. Thus, it is possible to recognize another way in which sentences that are fully well-formed syntactically and semantically, such as (16), fail to express a proposition when uttered.

With the utterances of sentences (7) and (16) to refer to a customer the speaker does not express a proposition with their sentence meaning since they fail to express a proposition due to the effect of what would be, if it were not be accommodated when interpreting its utterance, a "presupposition failure" (Glanzberg 2005, 367). If by an utterance the speaker attempts to convey a proposition by way of the truth conditions fixed by the meaning of the sentence uttered together with context but some semantic

presupposition is not available in the context, no such truth conditions are determined, and the attempt to convey information fails. The expression failure is produced because the sentence triggered a presupposition that failed in the context of the utterance of that sentence. The semantic presuppositions triggered by a sentence must be the case in an utterance of it or otherwise the sentence will fail to express a proposition.

In sum, there may be different ways in which expressions can fail to express a full proposition. One of them, which occurs in cases (1) and (7), is when an expression triggers a semantic presupposition and it fails in every context in which the sentence including it might be uttered. Evaluated in a world *w*, 'waiting for his check' presupposes that its subject denotes an animate entity in *w*. Predicates are assigned an extension, which is the set of things that the predicate is true of, and an anti-extension, which is the set of things that a predicate is false of. If the subject of the predicate denotes something that is neither in the extension nor in the anti-extension of the predicate, a presupposition failure is obtained, unless it gets accommodated. The utterance will be infelicitous unless the presuppositional requirement involved is resolved. Some pragmatic process is then demanded if a proposition is to be yielded by the utterance of that sentence. It is for that reason truth-conditionally demanded. Without it, the presupposition failure will remain and the utterance will fail to convey any proposition at all. For (1) and (7), it could be claimed that no full proposition is expressed by all utterances of them. (1) and (7) express propositional radicals because their semantic presuppositions always fail unless accommodation takes place. By means of a pragmatic process (in metonymy, in metaphor) the failure can get accommodated and the metonymic, or metaphoric proposition gets communicated.

Another way in which expressions may stop expressing a proposition is when there is a use of an expression in an unusual extra-linguistic context. The oddity occurs between the implicit context associated to a normal use of this expression, like in the metonymic use of (16), and the utterance of an expression in the actual unusual context. As a result of using 'the ham sandwich' in a context to refer to the customer who ordered a ham sandwich, one of its semantic presuppositions or "prediction", as Bach might say, fails: that 'the ham sandwich' will denote an object of the type indicated by the predicate encoded by 'ham sandwich', a ham sandwich. But the interpretation of the utterance may, for one reason or another, indicate that there will be a presupposition failure (a lack of assignment of an extension by means of the normal encoded meaning of the expression) if there is no pragmatic accommodation. In these cases, truth-conditional information is obligatorily demanded by the utterance of the sentence that expresses a propositional form which, in the given context, is but a propositional radical.

HAM SANDWICH is not a propositional constituent of the proposition conveyed by the utterance of sentences (7) and (16), rather it is a propositional constituent radical that needs completion to get HAM SANDWICH CUSTOMER if we want it to contribute to the determinate truth conditions of their respective propositions conveyed when they are uttered. The truth conditions are not determinate if the supplementation of the conceptual material is not brought about because without this pragmatic adjustment the presupposition failure that the unusual use of the expression entails will prevent the expression of a full proposition. The difference between (7) and (16) is that in the former the demand is truth-conditional from the sentence point of view, while in (16) it is from the utterance point of view. Still, it is not merely pragmatic.

Thus, we can even argue that metonymies in which there is no lack of semantic coordination are also cases of local completion rather than local expansion (coherent

with Romero and Soria 2010a). Be that as it may, this depends on taking into account that there is a way of activating completion by the use of sentences, but this does not mean that the demand for pragmatic information has to be optional.

4. *Conclusion*

After showing Bach's catalogue of the contents of the speaker's meaning, we have considered Bach's distinction between implicitures that involve completion and implicitures that involve expansion a great achievement as long as it marks that the process of figuring out implicitures can have either an obligatory or an optional demand. Nevertheless, we have reckoned that the boundary between completion and expansion must be revisited as we can give a more fine-grained distinction of the types of mandatory demand for pragmatic information. From this revision of what is mandatory and optional, we have proposed a new catalogue of inexplicit contents, summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4. *New catalogue of inexplicit contents*

Contents (inexplicit)	Direct	Explicit or explicitures	Disambiguation: 'bank'			LITERAL
			Reference assignment: 'he'			
			Mandatory$_{LT}$ lexical specialization: ''s', 'get', 'of'			
		Implicit or Implicitures	Completion	Local	Phrase: 'Child abuse', 'The ham sandwich is waiting for his check' (metonymy)	NON-LITERAL
				Sentence: 'Bach is coming'		
			Expansion	Local	Word: 'fell'	
					Phrase: 'France is hexagonal'	
				Sentence: 'You are not going to die'		
		Figurative: metaphor				
	Indirect	**Implied** or implicatures				

Understanding this classification entails being aware that the distinction between mandatory$_L$ and mandatory$_T$ is even more complex than suggested in section 2, in which there are just two types of examples that demand obligatorily the contextual information in what the speaker directly means: those whose demand is mandatory$_{LT}$ and those whose demand is mandatory$_T$. In the first cases the linguistic demand seems to exclude them from completion and in the second we have completion because, Bach would say, completion arises whenever an utterance of a sentence, even after disambiguation and reference fixing, does not by virtue of its linguistic meaning express a complete proposition. Nevertheless, if we want to use the distinction between mandatory$_{LT}$ and mandatory$_T$ to account for relevant clarifications in relation to completion, we have to be aware that there are two senses in which the demand for pragmatic information may be linguistic: lexical and compositional. Only the lexical demand characterizes explicit contents, while in completion there is no lexical item linguistically indicating it. In completion the demand may be linguistic but only from a compositional point of view. To account for this we have resorted to Bach's idea of lack of semantic coordination. To really achieve composition, we need linguistic elements to fit both syntactically and semantically. When a syntactically well-formed unit lacks semantic coordination, a pragmatic process is needed. The cases of completion that are demanded in this way are mandatory$_L$ from the truth-conditional point of view. In addition, completion may just

be demanded truth-conditionally, either from a sentence point of view or from an utterance point of view.

From the revision of what is mandatory$_L$ and what is mandatory$_T$, we have refined the boundaries of completion. On the one hand, we have excluded from local completion the cases that require mandatory$_{LT}$ lexical specialization. These cases are context dependent expressions that, by means of their linguistic meaning, demand contextual information to get determinate truth conditions. We have also specified the ways in which examples can be classified as cases of completion depending on the type of demand for pragmatic information. There are examples of sentence completion such as (1) and cases of local completion such as 'child abuse' whose demand is just mandatory$_T$. There are examples of phrasal completion such as (7) whose demand is mandatory$_L$ from a compositional point of view and mandatory$_T$ from and utterance point of view; and examples such as the metonymic utterance of (16) whose demand is just mandatory$_T$ from the utterance point of view. With this division in mind, we have classified metonymy as local completion rather than as local expansion or as transfer.

The revision of Bach's catalogue shows more accurately the type of relation between what is said and what is done in saying it allowing a distinction among the pragmatic strategies involved in what is directly meant. In the case of explicitures, the pragmatic strategies are disambiguation, reference assignment or lexical specialization. In the case of implicitures, the pragmatic strategy is the recovery of conceptual material or supplementation. In the case of metaphorical contents, the pragmatic strategy is transfer of meaning. In addition, the new criteria to specify clearly the distinction between completion and expansion show that, in our way of demarcating between the mandatory and the optional in what is directly meant, we accept that there are pragmatic processes that may admit an optional or a mandatory demand, something that is not usually admitted. Bach distinction between implicitures based on completion and implicitures based on expansion shows this for a particular case: the pragmatic process of figuring out implicit contents can have either an obligatory or an optional demand. This proposal contrasts with Recanati's view in which primary pragmatic processes are intrinsically obligatory or optional. Saturation and sense selection are obligatory while processes of modulation such as free enrichment, loosening and semantic transfer are optional pragmatic processes (Recanati 2004). In Recanati's position, free enrichment, the type of modulation that intervenes in what correspond to Bach's implicitures, is always optional. This constitutes an important difference from Bach's proposal that affects the way in which we can raisethe current debate on whether the notion of what is directly said is contextualist or minimalist, debate that depends to a great extent on the demarcation between mandatory and optional. If the distinctions in Bach's vein are admitted, Recanati's contextualism cannot be characterized as the position according to which optional pragmatic processes intervene in what is directly meant since the assumption that any process is obligatory or optional in an exclusive way is not accepted. We may call Bach a "contextualist" only if this means that there are optional demands to get to what is directly meant because he accepts that there are cases of expansion. Nevertheless, his contextualism is attenuated since, quite rightly, he realizes that the demand of contextual information in completion cases may be mandatory without it being lexical. The missing information is just conceptually demanded and is not part of the linguistic structure. The realm of mandatory unarticulated constituents arises.

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