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We will defend that belief ascriptions, as knowledge ascriptions or rationality ascriptions, should be treated as normative claims. We will explore the possibility of building an argument to this effect from the identification of not-straightforwardly factual disagreements in contexts in which the question at issue is the possibility of ascribing a particular belief to a subject.
- Pinedo, M. (forthcoming). “Contenido conceptual y sentidos de re”. In D. Pérez Chico (ed.), Cuestiones de filosofía del lenguaje, Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.
- Almagro Holgado, M. (2018). “Verdad sobre la no existencia: un problema para la teoría reduccionista de Tim Crane”. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 50(148), 99-113.
