El próximo jueves, 28 de noviembre, a las 12.30, en la Sala de Juntas de Filosofía, tendrá lugar otra sesión del TeC-FiloLab. En esta ocasión, contaremos con Sophie Keeling, investigadora Ramón y Cajal en la Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED). A continuación tenéis el título y el resumen de la charla, así como una breve nota sobre el trabajo de Sophie.
Resistant reasons
Abstract: Much research has centred around beliefs and actions that conflict with what are in fact good reasons. Here the archetypal case would be in in which, say, I believe that I am a kind person in spite of obvious evidence to the contrary. But we can also identify a related and under-explored phenomenon whereby what seems resistant is that one responds in some way to a particular reason or group of reasons (e.g., when I always listen to one unreliable friend whatever they say). In this talk, I will introduce the concept of resistant reasons and its applications in both philosophy of psychology and social philosophy.
Bio: I’m a ‘Ramon y Cajal’ fellow in philosophy at UNED, Madrid and a member of the Metis research group. I previously held research positions at at University College Dublin, University of Barcelona (with LOGOS), and at the University of Edinburgh where I also held a teaching post. I completed my PhD at the University of Southampton (2014-18).
My main interests include the philosophy of mind, epistemology, normativity and the philosophy of psychology. More specifically, it centres around why we act the way we act and think the way we do, and one kind of explanation in particular. Suppose I visit the shop because I’ve run out of snacks or believe it will rain because the weather forecast says that it will. Or more weightily, perhaps I believe that a political party is the best because of certain policies and vote accordingly. These are the reasons for which we believe and act, and are at the heart of rationality, responsibility, and agency.
This raises a bunch of questions: how do we come to know what our reasons are? What is it to believe and act for a reason? (my answer: self-awareness plays a key role!) Can we be aware of our reasons in a way that falls short of knowledge? (my answer: yes, we have experiential awareness!) Can we be responsible for believing and acting for a partiular reason, and exercise control over this? (my answer: yes!). This last question serves as the basis for my current project, and I hope to write a monograph on this theme.